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 1. PREMISES 
 Th e person, contract, tort, property and remedies form the  ‘ pillars ’ 1 of each and 
every private law system, whatever its origin might be, continental civil law or 
common law, and however it might appear, traditional private law or regulatory 
private law. 2 Th ese pillars are subject to a deep transformation, that should be 
termed  ‘ constitutional ’ and that is captured in Duncan Kennedy ’ s distinction 
between the three globalisations of law and their impact on legal thought. 3 Th e 
focus in this chapter is placed on European law and on the European Union 
(EU). EU law and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) are the 
drivers behind the transformation. Th is focus is justifi ed because the EU is not a 
state, because the EU has no European constitution and no European Civil Code, 
and because the CJEU is neither a constitutional court nor a supreme court. In 
other words, the EU is a very particular and unique entity containing a little bit 
of everything that makes for a state and a sovereign legal order. Th us, I claim 
that the  ‘ constitutional ’ transformation of the pillars of private law through the 
EU and the CJEU diff ers in form and in substance from seemingly comparable 
processes in at least some of the Member States. Personally, I take as plausible 
the notion of the experimental character of the EU as a new state formation. 
Th is perspective views the EU legal (dis)order as a new format for a legal order, 
with a court that, owing to its particular position in the multi-level structure 
of the EU, enjoys a degree of freedom and discretion that allows the Court to 
break boundaries that national courts (whether their position is constitutional 
or otherwise) tend to defend. However, such an understanding implies equally 
that my fi ndings are tentative and premature. 
 Th is chapter rests on previous research. I have written extensively on private 
law as economic law, on the EU as a market state, on the experimental character 
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of the EU, on the constitutionalisation of private law at the Member State and the 
EU level. What I am trying to develop in this chapter could be read as a follow-up 
to my hypothesis whereby constitutionalised European private law principles 
exist which hold the fragmented body of European private law together. 4 First, 
I would like to sketch and to summarise the major premises of my argument, 
without which the constitutional transformation of the pillars of private law 
is diffi  cult, if not impossible, to understand. Th e purpose is to highlight why 
thinking of EU private law as a new form of fragmented economic law, and 
why the EU legal (dis)order conceived as a laboratory, is crucial for getting to 
grips with  ‘ constitutionalisation ’ of the pillars of private law that is driven by 
the CJEU. Secondly, I will clarify the parameters of my analysis, namely, the 
three transformations of law that have been triggered by the diff erent waves of 
globalisation and how they fi t into the short life of the EU. Th irdly, I turn to my 
tentative account of the private law pillars, what I understand by  ‘ pillars ’, how 
they change over the three transformations and why the transformations can 
and must be termed  ‘ constitutional ’. In that sense I am using Duncan Kennedy ’ s 
seminal article as a tool box from which I take the distinction between the three 
waves of globalisation, but my interest lies in the transformations of law that these 
three waves of globalisation trigger and how these transformations interact with 
constitutionalisation. Once the premises are defi ned and the parameters of the 
analysis are established, I turn to a deeper analysis of four pillars of private law 
in section 3: the person, contract, property and remedies, always distinguishing 
the three transformations in private law from the constitutionalisation of private 
law. For reasons of time and space, I have left  out a discussion of the categories 
of values and tort, although we will note that they also belong to the pillars of 
European private law. 
 1.1.  SCOPE AND REACH OF PRIVATE LAW AS FRAGMENTED 
ECONOMIC LAW 
 Private law is meant to regulate the economy; private law may be viewed as 
 Wirtschaft srecht or as  droit  é conomique . From the perspective of the common 
law, however, the notions of  Wirtschaft srecht/droit  é conomique may not make 
as much sense. From the perspective of regulating the economy, private law is 
more than freedom of contract, private autonomy or  libert é de la volont é , for 




 5  For Germany, see  L. Raiser ,  Die Zukunft  des Privatrechts , De Gruyter, Berlin 1971. For France, 
see  G.  Farjat ,  Droit  é conomique ,  Presses Universitaires de France (PUF), coll. Th emis ,  Paris 
 1971 ( 2 nd rev. ed .,  1982 ) ; further,  H.  Collins ,  Regulating Contracts ,  Oxford University Press , 
 Oxford  1999 . Th ere is more to say on the relationship between traditional private law and 
regulatory private law, esp. on the degree to which constitutionalistion of regulatory private 
law spills over into traditional private law. However, as European private law remains the 
focus of my analysis, I will leave the analysis for a diff erent occasion. 
 6  H.-W.  Micklitz ,  ‘ Th e Visible Hand of European Private Law ’ in  P.  Eeckhout and 
 T.   Tridimas (eds.) ( 2009 )  28  Yearbook of European Law  3 – 60 . 
 7  Maybe even a self-suffi  cient system of deduction; see on the diff erence between system 
and order, the contributions in  J.  Dickson and  P.  Eleftheriadis (eds.),  Th e Philosophical 
Foundations of European Union Law ,  Oxford University Press ,  Oxford  2012 . 
 8  Not only European private law, but private law per se, as can be observed in a historical 
perspective. Th e EU, however, has accelerated the process and changed the form and 
substance of regulation:  H.-W.  Micklitz ,  ‘ Monistic Ideology vs Pluralistic Reality  – on the 
Search of a Normative Design for European Private Law ’ in  L.  Niglia (ed.)  Pluralism and 
European Private Law ,  Hart Publishing ,  Oxford  2013 , pp.  29 – 51 . 
private law order, in the EU, regulation predominates over freedom of contract. 
Such an understanding enlarges the scope and reach of private law considerably. 
From a more traditional understanding, regulatory private law is not regarded as 
part of a contract and tort.  ‘ Regulation ’ or more broadly  ‘ regulated private law ’ 
is understood as public administrative law and should be analysed separately. 
However, I claim that, without taking the regulatory dimension of private law 
into account, private law is stripped of its economic regulatory essence. 5 
 Regulation dates back to the late nineteenth century, but took a diff erent form 
during the welfare state and later, within and as an immanent part of European 
integration. From such a perspective, private law becomes ever more fragmented 
as a result of subject-related (employment law, consumer law) and sector-related 
regulation (telecommunication, postal services, energy [electricity and gas], 
transport, fi nancial services), as well as through the insertion of competition 
in domains formerly dominated by public monopolies. 6 Th e result is a private 
law that is diffi  cult to structure and which loses coherence. It looks  ‘ messy ’ and 
very diff erent from the understanding of private law in the nineteenth century 
as a  ‘ system ’. 7 Th e widening of the scope of private law 8 towards fragmented 
economic law matters, because the rules and the judgments to which I will refer 
mostly deal with fragmented regulatory private law. 
 1.2. EU  ‘ MARKET STATE ’ AND THE EUROPEAN LABORATORY 
 It is plain that the role and function of the nation state, in recent decades in 
particular, is undergoing a deep change. Th ere is agreement on the phenomenon; 
there is even agreement that the post-nation state is about to lose much of 
its territorial power to regulate the (national) economy and the companies 
Intersentia 53
Th e Constitutional Transformation of Private Law Pillars through the CJEU
 9  With  D.  Patterson ,  ‘ From the Nation State to the Market State: Th e Evolution of EU Private 
Law ’ in  B.  Van Vooren ,  St.  Blockmans and  J.  Wouters (eds.),  Th e EU ’ s Role in Global 
Governance: Th e Legal Dimension ,  Oxford University Press ,  Oxford  2013 , pp.  59 – 78 . 
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 11  For a deeper analysis of the post-nation state, see  D.  Patterson ,  ‘ Postmodernism ’ in 
 D.   Patterson ,  A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Th eory ,  2 nd ed .,  Wiley-Blackwell , 
 Oxford  2010 , p.  381 . 
 12  H.-W.  Micklitz ,  ‘ Th e European Union Project, Review Article ’ in  J.  Dickson and 
 P.   Eleftheriadis (eds.),  Th e Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law ,  Yearbook of 
European Law ,  Oxford University Press ,  Oxford  2013 , pp.  538 – 554 . 
 13  With regard to EU private law, see  O.  Gerstenberg ,  ‘ Constitutional Reasoning in Private 
Law: Th e Role of the CJEU in Adjudicating Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts ’ ( 2015 ) 
 21   ELJ  599 – 621 ;  C.  Sabel and  J.  Zeitlin ,  Experimentalist Governance in the European Union: 
Towards A New Architecture ,  Oxford University Press ,  Oxford  2012 . 
 14  See the homonymous title of her book, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2014. 
operating from within its territory. Th e range of positions is broad, ranging 
from claims for an adjustment of the nation state to the changing international 
economic environment to the assignment of a new understanding of statecraft  
and statutory functions. I build on Bobbitt ’ s concept of the market state for 
which the European Union could serve as a blueprint. 9 In a negative, though 
increasingly prominent understanding, the EU market state is being understood 
as a variation of the  ‘ nation state ’ that stands for a neoliberal understanding 
of the economy that dismantles the national social welfare states. 10 In a more 
positive reading, the EU market state is understood as a post-modern concept 
of the nation state 11 that yields a genuine European understanding of justice 
and off ers simultaneously the potential to put the social welfare ideology to an 
acid test. Th ere is an added value in the market state paradigm that is crucial 
for an understanding of constitutionalisation, namely, its imperfect character 
that permits us to understand the European legal order (read as counterpart 
to  ‘ system ’ ) as a huge laboratory in which the new forms of government and 
judicial governance are being tested and subjected to experiment. 12 Th is brings 
me seemingly close to Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin who have advanced 
the claims for experimentalist governance and experimentalist democracy. 13 
 1.3.  CONSTITUTIONALISATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE LAW 
 Constitutionalisation of private law has become a fashionable topic of research. 
However, sometimes it is not clear what it implies. Gutman speaks of  ‘ Th e 




 15  Implicit to this understanding is the idea of private law as a self-standing order that is not 
dependent on its establishment through codifi cation via public legislation. However, this is 
not the right occasion to go deeper into the discussion; see  H.-W.  Micklitz ,  ‘ Th e EU as a 
Federal Order of Competences and the Private Law ’ in  L.  Azoulai (ed.),  Th e Question of 
Competence in the European Union ,  Oxford University Press ,  Oxford  2014 , pp.  125 – 152 . 
 16  H.-W.  Micklitz ,  ‘ Th e Th reefold Phenomena of Constitutionalization in Private Law, Liber 
Amicorum Michael Joachim Bonell ’ ,  forthcoming  2016 ; the contribution derives from a larger 
project:  S.  Grundmann ,  M.  Renner and  H.-W.  Micklitz (eds.),  Privatrechtstheorie , vol.  2 , 
 Mohr Siebeck ,  T ü bingen  2015 . An English version is under preparation. Th e contribution is 
based on ch. 8 of the book. 
 17  Privatrechtsgesellschaft  und Marktwirtschaft  ( 1966 ) 17  ORDO 75 – 151. 
 18  E.-J.  Mestm ä cker ,  ‘ Auf dem Wege zu einer Ordnungspolitik f ü r Europa ’ in  E.-J.  Mestm ä cker , 
 H.  M ö ller and  H.P.  Schwartz (eds.),  Eine Ordnungspolitik f ü r Europa. Festschrift  f ü r Hans 
v.d. Groebe ,  Nomos ,  Baden-Baden  1987 ,  pp. 9 – 49 . 
 19  M.  Weber ,  Wirtschaft  und Gesellschaft  , esp. ch. VII on  Rechtssoziologie ( legal sociology ) p.  1 
( 1921  ed .) . 
 20  See for a stock taking of the diff erent theoretical approaches Cahier  à Th  è me,  Les Grandes 
Th  é ories du Droit Transnational ,  H.-W. Micklitz (ed.), with contributions from  K.  Tuori , 
 B.  Kingsbury ,  N.  Krisch and  R.B.  Stewart ,  H.  Muir Watt ,  Ch.  Joerges and  F.  Roedel , 
 F.  Cafaggi ,  R.  Zimmermann ,  G.-P.  Calliess and  M.  Renner ,  A.  Fischer-Lescano and 
 G.   Teubner ,  P.  Schiff Berman , ( 2013 )  1 – 2  Revue Internationale de Droit Economique 1 – 256. 
 21  I see a strong link to  H.  Collins ,  although he is referring to the making of European private 
law only, whilst I would call this a  ‘ constitutive ’ exercise:  Th e European Civil Code:  Th e Way 
Forward ,  Cambridge University Press ,  Cambridge  2008 . 
to the distribution of competences between the EU and the Member States. 
Whilst this might be a widespread understanding especially in countries that 
have a constitution, my starting point of analysis for the constitutionalisation 
of private law is diff erent. 15 I would like to distinguish between three diff erent 
phenomena. 16 Th e fi rst targets the claim that private law is self-constituting 
( Selbstkonstituierung )  – such as F. B ö hm ’ s idea of the private law society. 17 
E.-J. Mestm ä cker used the ordoliberal pool of ideas to explain the creation of 
a European economic constitution 18  –  ordo stands for  Ordnung or competitive 
order, liberal for the freedom granted to private parties and the ordo-liberal 
European Economic Constitution for a model in which the Member States 
remain responsible for social regulation. Th e second phenomenon concerns 
changing the substance of private law to make it  ‘ more just ’ (what M. Weber 
calls materialisation) 19 by means of fundamental and human rights; advocates 
had hoped that human rights and fundamental rights could be a means to fi ght 
and to outfl ank neoliberalism. Th e third condenses the discussion of private law 
beyond the state, where the counterpart to the nation state constitution is missing 
and where all sorts of theories of transnational law are attempting to embed 
private law in a transnational  ‘ constitutional ’ setting, through self-constitution 
or through internationally recognised human and fundamental rights. 20 
 In my understanding of the EU as a laboratory, the self-constitution of private 
law and the constitutionalisation of private law through fundamental and human 
rights come together. 21 Th at is why I am not following Kennedy, who seems to 
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 22  Th ere is an abundant literature on the European legal order as a constitutional order, on the 
European Economic Constitution and later on the European constitution with a small  ‘ c ’ ; 
N.  Walker ,  ‘ Big “C” or small “c”? ’ ( 2006 )  12  ELJ  12 – 14 . 
 23  See  Micklitz,  ‘ Introduction ’ , n. 4 above. 
 24  Rather cautious,  F.  Della Negra ,  ‘ Th e Uncertain Development of the Case Law on Consumer 
Protection in Mortgage Enforcement Proceedings: S á nchez Morcillo and Ku š ionov á ’ ( 2015 ) 
 52  CMLR (Common Market Law Review)  1 – 24 ; more outspoken,  V.  Trstenjak ,  ‘ Th e 
Infl uence of Human Rights and Basic Rights in Private Law ’ , XIX International Congress 
of Comparative Law, Vienna, 20 – 26 July 2014 , in  V.  Trstenjak and  P.  Weingerl (eds.)  Th e 
Infl uence of Human Rights and Basic Rights in Private Law ,  Springer ,  Switzerland  2016 , who 
equates constitutional with references to fundamental and human rights. 
associate constitutionalisation with the third wave of globalisation. Th e whole 
building of the European legal order could be understood as a constitutionalisation 
process, private law being the second pillar outside the Treaty. 22 However, due 
to the particular character of the European legal order,  ‘ constitutionalisation ’ 
of private law can hardly be compared to the constitutionalisation of private 
law within the Member States, such as in Germany or in Italy. Th e diff erences 
are crystallising in the search for the constitutional principles of European 
private law. 
 I have proposed a combination of the  ‘ constitutional traditions common to 
the Member States ’ with the  ‘ general principles of civil law ’, in order to establish a 
mechanism that allows us to distil out of the wide array of possible  ‘ principles of 
civil law ’ those that deserve to be given a  ‘ constitutional ’ status. 23 Th is necessity 
results from the CJEU ’ s decision to grant both primary and secondary Union 
law supremacy over Member States ’ law.  ‘ Supremacy ’ should not be confounded 
with  ‘ constitutional ’. Th at is why judgments of the CJEU in the fragmented fi eld 
of European private law could not be regarded, automatically, as  ‘ constitutional ’. 
Whenever the Court refers to fundamental and human rights, two questions 
have to be separated from each other, namely, whether a reference renders the 
judgment into a  ‘ constitutional ’ judgment and whether it enshrines or generates 
a constitutional  ‘ principle ’ . 24 We might assume that the  ‘ pillars ’ of private 
law  – i.e. the concepts that underpin the pillars  – are  constitutive for a society 
and, in that sense, they are of  ‘ constitutional ’ importance. We might also assume 
that the pillars mirror changing  ‘ principles ’, although this does not explain what 
is meant by principles. 
 Th ere is more. Does a fragmented, even constitutionalised, private law 
need  ‘ principles ’ ? Principles suggest that there is a kind of safety net for all the 
fragmented European private law rules, which are and which could be held 
together. Such a reading even comes close to the idea of  ‘ coherence ’. Is this correct ? 
Is it needed ? Is it possible ? Could it be that the principles we are looking for are 




 25  Y.  Svetiev ,  ‘ European Regulatory Private Law: From Confl icts to Platforms ’ in  K.  Purnhagen 
and  P.  Rott (eds.),  Varieties of European Economic Law and Regulation: Liber Amicorum 
Hans Micklitz ,  Springer ,  Switzerland  2014 , p.  153 . 
 26  ‘ R. Dworkin: Law as Integrity ’ available at:  < http://theoryofj urisprudence.blogspot.
it/2007/12/ronald-dworkin-law-as-integrity.html > accessed 24.09.2016; see also  L.  Fuller ’ s 
 8 desiderata in the  Morality of the Law ,  Yale University Press ,  New Haven  1964 . 
 27  B.  De Witte and  H.-W.  Micklitz (eds.),  Th e ECJ and the Autonomy of the Member States , 
 Intersentia ,  Antwerp  2012 . 
 28  Collins, n. 21 above. 
with a view to aiming to  ‘ managing diff erence ’ (Kennedy) ? 25 If this is true, what 
then remains for human and fundamental rights, which are invoked by their 
rights holders to claim substantive protection ? Or is the substance integrated 
into the procedure, which is the predominant approach of the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) with regard to the right to be heard under Article 6 ? 
I  cannot provide an answer yet. Th is contribution, however, might help to 
develop the debate further. 
 1.4. EUROPEAN COURTS AND CJEU CASE LAW 
 Why do courts (and not parliaments) hold such a prominent position in the 
constitutionalisation of the pillars of private law ? Why are constitutional courts 
at the forefront of developments  – and even more diffi  cult to answer  – why 
are European courts the drivers of development ? As said before, the analysis 
is focusing on the constitutionalisation of European private law, so there is 
no need and no interest in going into the role of courts at the national level. 
Without much ado I subscribe to Ronald Dworkin ’ s analysis and explanation 
as to why judges have turned into the super-heroes of our times, 26 which has 
been taken up by Duncan Kennedy in  ‘ Th e Th ree Globalisations ’ of law. Again, 
however, I  have to insist on the particularities of the European legal order 
and the key role of the CJEU in the overall constitutionalisation process, the 
constitutionalisation of the European legal order and the constitutionalisation 
of private law. Th is does not mean that there are no other potential actors who 
promote this constitutionalisation, such as the Member States, the European 
Commission, the European Council, the European Parliament that have enlarged 
the competences of the EU and have approved though sometimes grudgingly 27 
the dominant role of the CJEU as the driver behind the constitutionalisation 
of the EU, let alone the potential building of a private legal order bottom up 
through the parties themselves. 28 However, in European private law, the role and 
importance of the CJEU is far more important, both because there is no legal 
basis in the Treaty to harmonise private law and because there is no equivalent 
in the European legal order to what I call traditional private law. 
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approach, described above, to private law, too. To this end, it should  – in a fi rst step  – not only 
challenge  “ nation state failures ” , in particular, the violation of freedom and equality rights 
and the shift ing of externalities of one ’ s own action to neighbours ( “ beggar my neighbour 
politics ” ), but also challenge self-evident irrational or ineffi  cient instances of national 
governance which harm national citizens in their status as European citizens. ’ 
 34  H.-W.  Micklitz ,  ‘ A Comment on Party Autonomy and Consumer Regulation in the European 
Community  – A Plea for Consistency ’ in  S.  Grundmann ,  W.  Kerber and  S.  Weatherill 
(eds.),  Party Autonomy and the Role of Information in the Internal Market ,  de Gruyter, Berlin 
 2001 ,  pp. 197 – 204 . 
 Th e following aspects are of outstanding importance in understanding the 
positioning of the CJEU: the institutional architecture of the EU, which grants 
the CJEU adjudicative power concerning the interpretation of EU law, but not 
the power to decide the case at issue. 29 Th is distribution of responsibilities, 
which is by and large respected by the CJEU, strengthens an understanding of 
the CJEU as an experimentalist court, 30 which does not have to bear the direct 
consequences of the outcome of its judgments. Th is is left  to the Member States ’ 
courts or the Member States ’ governments, who have to apply a CJEU judgment 
to the case at issue. Such an understanding fi ts nicely with Komesar ’ s theory 
of institutional choice. 31 Th e preliminary reference procedure opens up an 
alternative path of adjudication, in particular in circumstances where access to 
national courts might be possible but not feasible for all sorts of political reasons 
or where there is no access at all. 
 However, neither explanation helps us understand why and how the CJEU 
acts and should act as a constitutional court rather than as a private law court 
of last resort. Ch. Schmid 32 underlines the inability of the CJEU to develop out 
of the incoherent and piecemeal European private law fi nely tuned doctrines of 
private law and advocates a constitutional  ‘ substantive core and procedural 
halo ’ approach. 33 Whilst I am unsure whether I still believe in the feasibility of a 
systematic and coherent private law doctrine, 34 I certainly agree with Schmid ’ s 
strong emphasis on developing constitutional  ‘ meta-principles ’. Th is might well 
be the only remaining opportunity for constitutional courts to hold  ‘ the ever 
more fragmented private law ’ together and this might also be the deeper reason 




 35  Th e ERC project on European Regulatory Private Law is based on my article on the visible 
hand (see n. 6 above); see for details of the project and the diverse publications  < https://blogs.
eui.eu/erc-erpl/ > . 
 36  N.  J ä ä skinen and  A.  Ward ,  ‘ Th e External Reach of EU Private Law in the Light of L ’ Or é al 
versus eBay and Google and Google Spain ’ in  M.  Cremona and  H.-W.  Micklitz (eds.), 
 Private Law in the External Relations of the EU ,  Oxford University Press ,  Oxford  2016 , 
pp.  33 – 58 . 
 37  H.-W.  Micklitz and  B.  Kas ,  Overview of Cases before the CJEU on European Consumer 
Contract Law ( 2009 – 2013 )  pt I ( 2014 )  10  ERCL (European Review of Contract Law)  1 – 63 ; 
pt II (2014) 10  ECRL 189 – 257. Bet ü l Kas regularly updates the overview on the CJEU case 
law in the  ERCL . 
 38  I will neither discuss the impact of his paper nor critique the distinction since 2006, but 
see  C.P. Wells ,  ‘ Th oughts on Duncan Kennedy ’ s Th ird Globalization ’ , Boston College Law 
School Faculty Papers, 04.01.2012. 
courts are too much bound to the search for coherence and consistency (in 
continental and in the common law). 
 Th e object of my studies is European private law understood as fragmented 
economic law. 35 In theory, my approach requires the inclusion of the case law 
of the ECtHR. It is well known that the ECtHR increasingly intervenes into the 
private law of its Member States, which is not always well regarded. Th e ECtHR 
applies the right to be heard, into which  ‘ substantive ’ issues are then integrated. 
Th is comes close to what the CJEU is doing when it applies the Brussels 
Convention or the Brussels Regulation to private law litigation with respect to 
non EU-Member States. 36 However interesting an analysis of the Strasbourg 
Court might be, for the time being I limit myself to evidence concerning the 
ongoing constitutionalisation and the suggested restructuring of the pillars of 
private law to CJEU case law (as far as it exists). 37 
 2. PARAMETERS 
 Let us accept Kennedy ’ s categories whereby he distinguishes between three waves 
of globalisation of legal thought. 38 Th ey help to circumscribe the appearance of 
the transformations and the reasons behind the transformation. Th at is why the 
transformations and not the waves of globalisation are my parameters. I will 
only use  ‘ globalisation ’ when I deliberately refer to Kennedy ’ s diff erent states, 
in particular in explaining the key elements and in applying them to the EU. 
Whenever it comes to the eff ects of globalisation in the law, I use ‘transformation’ 
as the key word. 
 Th e three phases of transformation of law should not be confounded with 
constitutionalisation. Th at is why the three transformations mirrored in the 
pillars of private law and the changing patterns of constitutionalisation must 
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 39  For how I used the same methodology to analyse the development of legal thought in France, 
Germany, the UK and the EU, see  H.-W.  Micklitz ,  ‘ Th e (Un)-Systematics of (Private) Law 
as an Element of European Legal Culture ’ in  G.  Helleringer and  K.  Purnhagen (eds.), 
 Towards a European Legal Culture ,  Beck/Hart/Nomos ,  Munich / Oxford / Baden-Baden  2014 , 
pp.  81 – 115 . 
 40  Kennedy , n. 3 above, p. 25. 
 41  I do not think that neoformalism can be linked to neoliberalism, at least not in the way 
Kennedy uses neoformalism, in particular through his claim of  ‘ managing diff erence ’ . In so 
far the critique that Kennedy forgets about the role and function of the  ‘ market ’ seems to be 
overstated, see  J.  Deautels-stein and  D.  Kennedy ,  ‘ Foreword: Th eorizing Contemporary 
Legal Th ought ’ ( 2015 )  78  Law and Contemporary Problems ,  i . 
be kept separated from each other. Th is is done in section 3 via the distinction 
between  ‘ transformation ’ and  ‘ constitutionalisation ’ (see below). 
 2.1.  THREE GLOBALISATIONS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 
IN THE EU 
 Kennedy distinguishes three phases of globalisation in legal thought that shaped 
and are still shaping our understanding of private law. Legal thought is refl ected 
in legal consciousness. 39 It is, therefore, a bottom-up approach: 
 ‘ the fi rst globalisation occurred during the second half of the nineteenth century and 
was over by WWI. What was globalized was a mode of legal consciousness  … the late 
19 th century mainstream saw law as  “ a system ” , having a strong international structural 
coherence based on the three traits of exhaustive elaboration of the distinction between 
private and public,  “ individualism ” and commitment to legal interpretative formalism. ’ 40 
 Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the  ‘ social question ’  – what Duncan 
Kennedy simply coined  ‘ Th e Social ’  – became more important. States had to deal 
with the political claims of the workers (today we use the more distinguished 
term  ‘ employees ’ ). If these claims did not aim at the abolition of the capitalistic 
economic order entirely, they targeted improvements of working conditions, 
which were also refl ected in demands for balanced labour contracts; later, 
with the rise of the consumer society, they were also refl ected in demands for 
balanced consumer contracts. Th e fi rst and second globalisation can easily 
be shaped and clearly combined with categories along the line of distinctions 
and values that we all understand and share, even if we disagree as to their 
 ‘ weight ’. Th e third globalisation is said to be characterised by  ‘ neoformalism ’. 
Neoformalism 41 is  ‘ neo ’ as it transfers Classical Legal Th ought, meaning private 
law thinking, to the public sector, to policies and institutions without taking into 
account that  ‘ policy analysis ’ is structurally bound to a particular policy subject 




 42  N.  Luhmann ,  Wirtschaft  der Gesellschaft  ,  Suhrkamp Verlag ,  Frankfurt am Main  1994 , 
p.  344 :  ‘ Nie kann der S ü ndenfall der Ausdiff erenzierung selbst zur ü ckgenommen werden. 
Man kehrt nicht ins Paradies zur ü ck. ’ 
 43  K.  Tuori ,  European Constitutionalism ,  Cambridge University Press ,  Cambridge  2015 , 
although Tuori does not exclude the possibility of coherence, and what it might mean in a 
positive legal order without commitments to transcendental values. 
 44  I disagree. With regard to the rise of  ‘ Th e Social ’ the break-even point in Europe may still 
be found in the encyclical of Pope Leo VIII  Rerum Novarum from 1891 ( neue Dinge , new 
things). It has given rise to a  ‘ new vision ’ of the state which had to compensate for the missing 
social structures (rural families, guilds) in the industrial age. I would equally argue that the 
start of the third globalisation goes hand in hand with the fi nancialisation of the economy 
aft er the collapse of Bretton Woods. But these are  ‘ fi nesses ’ that are not important for the 
overall argument. 
 45  For the sake of the argument it is not necessary to discuss whether the timelines are  ‘ correct ’ . 
Such classifi cations are always debatable. 
 46  Relatively optimistic,  K. Tuori ,  ‘ European Social Constitution between Solidarity and 
Access Justice ’ in  Purnhagen and  Rott , n. 25 above, pp. 371 – 400; much more critical, 
 D.  Schiek ,  Economic and Social Integration: Th e Challenge for EU Constitutional Law , Edward 
 Elgar ,  Cheltenham  2012 . 
or something similar can be achieved, if at all, only in narrow policy fi elds that 
are kept distinct from overarching infl uences from other policy fi elds. Th is fi ts 
nicely with Luhmann 42 and Teubner who stress, constantly, the irreversibility of 
the diff erentiation and fragmentation of society or with Tuori who has coined 
the term of the  ‘ many constitutions of the European Union ’. 43 Duncan Kennedy 
stresses the rise of transcendent values (in particular anti-discrimination) and 
the key role of courts as the legal heroes of our times. Roughly speaking, the fi rst 
globalisation  – Classical Legal Th ought  – covers the period from 1850 – 1914; 
the second globalisation  – the Rise of  ‘ Th e Social ’  – 1900 – 1968; 44 and the third 
globalisation  – neoformalism  – 1945 – 2000. 45 
 Kennedy ’ s genealogy of the three globalisations does not really fi t the EU. 
Historically, the EU was established in the middle of the second globalisation 
(according to my understanding, though already in the period of the third 
globalisation according to Duncan Kennedy).  ‘ Th e Social ’ had to be taken into 
account right from its beginning. Th e foundational treaty from the 1950s relied 
on a separation of responsibilities, market building at the EU level and  ‘ Th e 
Social ’ at the Member State level. Within less than 60 years  – 1957 until today  – 
the EU had to go through, maybe better to catch up with, the three stages of 
globalisation. Th e relatively quiet formative years 1957 – 1986, market building, 
resemble developments in the nineteenth century along the line of Classical 
Legal Th ought. Th e rise of  ‘ Th e Social ’ started with the adoption of the Single 
European Act in 1986, an attempt by the Member States to  ‘ catch up ’ at the 
EU level with the development of the welfare (nation) states that go back to 
the beginning of the twentieth century and ended in half-hearted attempts to 
transform the EU into a Social Union. 46 However,  ‘ Th e Social ’ did not really fi nd 
Intersentia 61
Th e Constitutional Transformation of Private Law Pillars through the CJEU
 47  See for an explanation of the extremely diff erent reactions in the Member States,  S.  Steinmo , 
 Th e Evolution of the Modern States ,  Cambridge University Press ,  Cambridge  2010 ; for the 
impact on the EU (Euro) crisis, see the writings of F.W. Scharpf and W. Streek. 
 48  Social justice and access justice in private law, in  H.-W.  Micklitz (ed.),  Th e Many Faces of 
Social Justice in Private Law ,  Edward Elgar ,  Cheltenham  2011 , pp.  3 – 60 . 
 49  I cannot discuss whether and to what extent the Euro-crisis has undermined such a 
distinction, esp. through taking away from the Member States the possibility to devaluate 
their currency as a means to cope with the diff erences in productivity. 
 50  M.  H ö ppner and  A.  Sch ä fer ,  Embeddedness and Regional Integration: Waiting for Polanyi in 
a Hayekian Setting ( 2013 )  Summer 66  Int ’ l Organisation  429 – 455 with many references from 
the controversial discussions in law and political science. 
its way into in the EU legal order. Ironically, the timid rise of  ‘ Th e Social ’ at the 
EU level in the mid-1980s went hand in hand with a decline or transformation 
of ‘Th e Social’ at the Member State level. 47 Th us, by necessity,  ‘ Th e Social ’ at the 
EU level would have a diff erent outlook. In my understanding, the EU cannot 
do more than lay down minimum standards in order to guarantee what I have 
called  ‘ access justice ’ ( Zugangsgerechtigkeit ). 48 It remains, then, for the Member 
States to go beyond that fl oor level. 49 Th e third stage of globalisation  –  ‘ policy 
analysis ’,  ‘ neoformalism ’ and  ‘ adjudication ’  – gained pace in the aft ermath of the 
Single European Act with the shift  from modelling a federal Europe to craft ing 
Europe through governance. 
 Th e second globalisation ( ‘ Th e Social ’ ) and the third globalisation 
(neoformalism) coincide by and large in time. Th e CJEU turned into the 
intellectual, the political and the judicial  ‘ hero ’ of the EU, though some might 
claim that the projects of judicial and political integration were separating. 50 
However, I cannot identify any other institutional player, neither at the Member 
State nor at the EU level, who is willing to tackle all the issues left  open by 
national and European parliaments that the third globalisation yields and that 
are inundating constitutional courts. Courts have to decide, for there is no 
competence of judicial self-restraint in the EU. Even if constitutional courts in 
general and European courts in particular refuse to engage in what is called here 
 ‘ constitutionalisation ’, the problems resulting from insuffi  ciencies in municipal 
laws (continental and common law) remain. 
 2.2.  EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW PILLARS AND THE THREE 
TRANSFORMATIONS 
 In light of the three waves of globalisation, the overall process of transformation 
of the pillars of private law through EU law and the CJEU is captured in the 




 51  I set aside the diffi  culties in defi ning property; esp. with regard to the diff erent understandings 
in the common law and the continental legal systems, see  S.  Van Erp and B. Akkermans , 
 Property Law, Ius Commune Casebooks for the Common Law of Europe ,  Hart Publishing , 
 Oxford  2012 . 
 52  Complement in this way: Th e idea of fault as an excess of the will, so closely related to 
contract. Our obligations are either an act of self-determination (contract) or imposed on us 
to protect the self-determination of others (within a liberal framework). Otherwise, one is 
left  to fend for oneself in Classical Legal Th ought, in the face of fortuna; see  F.  Ewald ,  L ’ Etat 
Providence ,  Grasset ,  Paris  1986 . Responsibility as personal rather than a social phenomenon. 
 53  W.  van Gerven ,  ‘ On Rights, Remedies and Procedures ’ ( 2001 )  38  CMLR  501 . 
are meant to indicate a genuine mode of constitutionalisation. Analytically, 
transformation and constitutionalisation have to be kept distinct, but it will 
have to be shown that the particular form of constitutionalisation cannot be 
understood without its particular grounding in the respective transformation. 
 In line with my understanding of private law as economic law ( Privatrecht als 
Wirtschaft srecht ) I regard the person, contract and property 51 as the three pillars 
on which each and every private law order rests. Tort is a natural complement 
as it lays down non-contractual rights and duties. 52 Th e integration of  ‘ remedies ’ 
might come as a surprise, in particular for a continental lawyer. Continental 
private law systems distinguish sharply between substance and procedure, 
the substance codifi ed in the  Code Civil , the  Codice Civile , the  Wetboek or the 
 B ü rgerliches Gesetzbuch , the procedure equally codifi ed in an  ‘ Act of Parliament 
on Procedural Law ’. Legal education still keeps the two areas distinct. Th e 
curriculum for undergraduates exhaustively concentrates on  ‘ substance ’ ; 
educational training in legal (judicial) procedure is procedural. Th e common 
law has a more holistic approach. Th is might explain why neither in French, nor 
in Italian nor in German, is there an appropriate translation for  ‘ remedies ’. In his 
seminal article Walter van Gerven 53 speaks of rights, remedies and procedures, 
in order to make the European understanding  – which is a true common law 
legacy  – more accessible for continental lawyers. 
 2.3. HOW THE ARGUMENT FLOWS 
 In the light of the foregoing, I will focus on person, contract, property and 
remedies. Categories and catchwords indicating the move from one stage to 
the next stage of transformation and its ongoing constitutionalisation are as 
helpful as they are dangerous. Th ey are helpful in that they permit the labelling 
of developments of legal consciousness and legal thought. Th ey are dangerous 
in that they imply a certain simplifi cation and might overstate new phenomena 
to the detriment of the inertia of old phenomena. Th e separation between the 
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 54  H.-W.  Micklitz (ed.),  Th e Many Concepts of Social Justice in European Private Law , Edward 
 Elgar ,  Cheltenham  2011 . 
 55  See my introduction to ch. 15  Risiko ,  ‘ Delikt und Haft ung ’ in  Grundmann, Micklitz and 
 Renner (eds.), n. 16 above, pp. 1142 – 1160. 
 56  Th is is masterfully analysed by  L. Josserand ,  ‘ L ’ é volution de la responsabilit é ’ (conf é rence 
donn é e aux Facult é s de Droit de Lisbonne, de Coimbre, de Belgrade, de Bucarest, d ’ Orades, 
de Bruxelles,  à l ’ institut fran ç ais de Madrid, aux centres juridiques de L ’ Institut des Hautes 
 É tudes marocaines  à Rabat et  á Casablanca)  É volutions et Actualit é s Conf é rences de Droit 
Civil, Receuil Sirey, Paris 1936, p. 29-5. 
 57  U.  Beck ,  Die Risikogesellschaft  ,  Suhrkamp ,  Frankfurt am Main  1986 . 
 58  Th e most advanced concept of what they call  ‘ Organisationshaft ung ’  – organisational 
liability  – has been presented by  G.  Br ü ggemeier and  Z.  Yan ,  Entwurf f ü r ein chinesisches 
Haft ungsrecht ,  Mohr Siebeck ,  T ü bingen  2009 , which is unfortunately not available in English, 
but which however, should be understood as a counterpart to the 19th-century model of 
tort law in the Draft  Common Frame of Reference which sticks to negligence as the basis for 
triggering liability, setting the transformation of the economy totally aside. 
three waves of globalisation and the new forms of transformation is not as clear 
as the table suggests. One last disclaimer is needed. I will not deal with values 
and tort. 
 Values as a category are self-explanatory. I will stay away from going 
deeper into values in private law systems, how they have been transformed 
over the last 150 years in contract law and to what extent they have been 
constitutionalised. It might suffice to recall that each wave of transformation 
can be associated with one particular  ‘ value ’ . The European integration process 
gradually yields its own model of justice  – a model which I call  ‘ access justice ’ /
Zugangsgerechtigkeit (justice  through access,  not access  to justice), i.e. it is for 
the European Union to grant access justice to those who are excluded from the 
market or to those who have difficulties making use of the market freedoms. 54 
 ‘ Access justice ’ /Zugangsgerechtigkeit is not to be equated with social justice in 
the meaning it has developed over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in 
nation states. 
 I will equally leave out tort law, although the waves of transformation have 
left  deep traces on the way in which liability is conceived of, and on the degree 
to which tort has been constitutionalised. 55 In the fi rst transformation, Classical 
Legal Th ought is to be associated with liability for negligence. Th e second 
transformation questions fault as a central category. Th e move from manual 
production to industrialisation promoted strict liability, which disconnects 
compensation claims from strict proof of negligent behaviour. 56 Th e third 
transformation raises challenges to negligence-based tort liability, in particular 
through the emergence of new risks 57 and the way in which companies with 
transnational operations organise their supply chains, upstream and downstream, 




 59  Using  K.  Ladeur ’ s,  ‘ Th e Evolution of General Administrative Law and the Emergence of 
Postmodern Administrative Law ’ , Osgoode CLPE Research Paper No. 16/2011 , distinction 
between the society of fi rms, organisations and networks, which roughly complies with 
Kennedy ’ s 3 globalisations; see my contribution  ‘ Th e ECJ between the Individual Citizen and 
the Member States  – A Plea for a Judge-made European Law on Remedies ’ in  De Witte and 
 Micklitz , n. 27 above, pp. 349 – 400. 
 60  I hope to benefi t from  R. Condon ’ s PhD research at the EUI, which shall be defended in the 
course of 2016 and which will go deeper into the design of network liability and the role of 
the  Francovich doctrine. 
Th e  Francovich doctrine could be understood as laying down the foundations 
for network liability. 59 I will leave it for another occasion yet to go deeper into 
 ‘ tort ’ as a private law pillar. 60 
 2.4.  THREE TRANSFORMATIONS IN PRIVATE LAW 
AND CONSTITUTIONALISATION OF PRIVATE LAW 
 In the following, I will analyse the four pillars one by one, starting each and every 
analysis with an overall hypothesis that I will try to verify or to falsify. Th e analysis 
of the four pillars follows the same structure. I will start by demonstrating how 
the three transformations of law aff ect the four pillars. I am collecting evidence 
to underpin my argument that there is a transformation that can be observed. In 
that sense it is an empirical, bottom-up examination, using the methodology of 
legal consciousness. I will proceed along the line of the catchwords that I have 
condensed in Table 1. 
 Table 1. Private law pillars and the three  ‘ transformations ’ 
 First Transformation  Second Transformation  Th ird Transformation 
 Values  Corrective justice  Social justice  Access justice 
 Person  Person  Social rights  Identity-based rights 
 Contract  Formal rationality  Social contracts  Procedural contracts 
 Tort  Negligence liability  Strict liability  Network liability 
 Property  Absolute rights  Social property rights  Political property rights 
 Remedies  Promise  Eff ectiveness  Managing diff erences 
 Th e more diffi  cult question to answer is why, how and to what extent the 
transformations encompass/yield a constitutional dimension, more concretely 
a new form of constitutionalising private law pillars. Th us, I will build on how 
I understand and defi ne constitutionalisation. I focus on the European Union 
and European Union law and I place the third transformation at the forefront 
of my analysis. Th e reasons for this is not only time and space but my deep 
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 61  It would go beyond the chapter to lay down the changing person in its private and societal 
relations. Social class is certainly a part of the second globalisation, but it is not so much 
social class as  ‘ the individual understood as a social category ’ , with identity-based rights 
being  ‘ the individual understood as a self choosing actor with regard to his identity ’ . So, 
non-traditional individualism  à la U. Beck ’ s analysis in  Risk Society , whereby in the fi rst 
modernity, the individual was embedded in relations, whereas individual rights were about 
the individual ’ s relations to the whole, i.e. society; individual as distinct from political society, 
but not to the exclusion of moral law, just social obligation limited by law/moral dichotomy. 
In  ‘ Th e Social ’ ,  pace Durkheim, morals are to be understood as social facts, therefore, a social 
responsibility vis- à -vis the individual. Today, it is now about the individual ’ s relations with 
himself as refl exive. A type of individualism as solipsism perhaps. 
 62  R.  Demogue ,  ‘ Th e Legal Subject, the Social Class and Identity Based Rights in a European 
Perspective ’ in  L.  Azoulai ,  S.  Barbou Des Places and  E.  Patout (eds.),  Th e Category of the 
Person in EU Law ,  Hart Publishing , Oxford  2016 . 
conviction that it is at the third level of transformation where the particularities 
of the EU, its fragmented character, its quasi-statutory format, its notorious 
experimentalism, its multi-level governance deliver the most promising and 
most fascinating evidence for studying the constitutional transformation of the 
pillars of private law. At the very end of the chapter, I will come back to the 
overall diffi  culty regarding how to distinguish between constitutional and non-
constitutional transformations. 
 3. PERSON 
 Th e overall hypothesis is the move from the classical person to social class to 
identity-based rights. 61 In this respect, the CJEU case law is rather well developed 
and indicates a clear orientation towards fragmented right holders, in which a 
new constitutionalised  ‘ person ’ emerges: the  mandataire . 
 3.1.  TRANSFORMATIONS: FROM PERSONS 
TO IDENTITY-BASED RIGHTS 
 Elsewhere I have laid down the theoretical foundations of the transformation 
of the person through the confrontation of Demogue ’ s ground-breaking article 
on the  ‘ legal subject ’ with Kennedy ’ s concept of  ‘ identity based rights ’. 62 Whilst 
Demogue struggles with the well-known phenomenon on how to identify the 
holder of social rights  – a running theme throughout the twentieth century  – 
Kennedy recognises in the third globalisation a new layer in the genealogy of 
the person: 
 ‘ Contemporary legal consciousness organizes rights claimants according to their 
plural cross cutting identities. Identity represents at once: an extension of and a total 
transformation of the categories  – social class and minority  – through which the social 




 63  I have taken the liberty of putting his own words together, cutting out here and there bits and 
pieces, to make it more readable. But all words are  ‘ his ’ words and all are on p. 66. 
 64  K.  Carr ,  Deconstructing and Reconstructing Family Law through the European Legal Order , 
 PhD EUI  2014 , p.  118 : ‘It is important to state from the outset, and as we will see this becomes 
a fundamental element in terms of the resolution of peripheral family law cases, that this 
third globalisation is founded on an identity-based notion of rights. We can think about 
rights for women and as illustrated, for consumers and other “vulnerable” groups. Th is 
relates to our discourse in terms of the reconstruction of the path to asserting one’s rights. 
For example during the fi rst globalisation we can safely say that the path to be followed 
was one based on a formalistic consensus of wills – full stop. Th e social, in making some 
moves towards the integration of social justice made room for collective considerations and 
utilitarian approaches to the settlement of disputes. Here, however, we see an identity-based 
notion of rights i.e. I am a woman and a consumer and therefore I possess certain rights, not 
I possess rights per se. Th is diff ers from the Social in that it reintegrates the social into the 
legal system at the level of arguments about constitutional rights and balancing policy and 
identity’. 
 65  See  F.  Swennen ,  ‘ Contractualisation of Family Law  – La Contractualisation du Droit de la 
Famille ’ , XIXth  International Congress of Comparative Law ,  Vienna  2014 , II.A.4, on fi le with 
author. 
 66  Th e so-called MiFID Directive 2004/39 [2004] OJ L145/1 has introduced diff erent types of 
investors, professional, semi-professional and inexperienced. 
 67  Th is is/will be challenged by feminists, critical race scholars and critics generally. Th e typical 
response is: woman/gay/black people, but also the employees. 
preoccupation not with dominant but with subordinated or discriminated or persecuted 
identities, is the basis of a claim against the  “ majority ” or the  “ dominant culture ” , and 
is in fact a true lingua franca, just as applicable to the law of the market. On the side of 
the typical benefi ciaries of identity discourse are  “ weak parties ” now even the  “ poor ” 
understood as an identity rather than as a class. On the side of  “ strong parties ” such as 
employers, creditors, sellers, there has been a sustained eff ort to reconfi gure property 
and contract rights as parallel to minoritarian identity/rights. ’ 63 
 Th is account speaks for itself and might be shared by many people, both 
empirically and theoretically. Individuals can easily change their roles, from 
producers to consumers, from citizens to travellers. Th ey have many identities 
and each of our respective identities can be connected to a particular right. 
Children have rights and the elderly have rights, consumers and women have 
rights. 64 Identity-based rights may be established through statute or through 
contract. One might even observe a tendency towards the contractualisation of 
identity, most spectacularly in the debate around a gender-based identity, 65 but 
also with regard to investor rights, 66 in which the investor may classify herself 
and become subject to a diff erent set of rights. 
 Identity-based rights always start from an element of  weakness . 67 Th is 
is true even for property right owners who claim compensation for the 
infringement of their rights by third world countries with the help of the 
Intersentia 67
Th e Constitutional Transformation of Private Law Pillars through the CJEU
 68  See the contributions from  G. Command é , A. Colombi Ciacchi, M. Bell, 
O. Cherednychenko, Ch. Godt and Ch. Mak in  Micklitz , n. 4 above, with a word of a 
warning from  H. Collins on the risk of proliferation. 
 69  See  A.  Ottow ,  Market and Competition Authorities ,  Oxford University Press ,  Oxford  2015 . 
World Trade Organization. Sociologically speaking, the rise of identity-based 
rights goes hand in hand with the victimisation of the  ‘ individual ’, with the 
fragmentation of societal roles (not classes and stratifi cations) and sectors of 
the economy (consumer and customer), and with the transformation of the 
person as a normative legal category. In the nineteenth century, the person as 
an autonomous self-responsible person formed the core of the normative legal 
system. In the twenty-fi rst century, the individual appears as the holder of a 
whole bunch of identity-based human and fundamental rights that he or she can 
invoke according to current needs, where he or she may claim the enforcement 
of individual rights or where he or she defi nes himself or herself as member of 
a particular group of weaker parties, aff ected by particular economic, social or 
political circumstances. 68 
 Contrary to the political and legal debates in the EU Member States in the 
early twentieth century, the brief rise of  ‘ the EU Social ’ did not signifi cantly 
impact the working classes and worker rights.  ‘ Th e Social ’ in the EU takes a 
very peculiar form, embracing not so much  ‘ Th e Social ’ in the meaning given 
to it by Kennedy in the second globalisation, but covering diff erent policy 
fi elds with a social dimension, such as anti-discrimination law, environmental 
and consumer law. Th e diff erent policy fi elds, united more or less under the 
umbrella of  ‘ Th e Social ’ , show many characteristics of the third  globalisation , 
so it is possible that the policy fi eld is linked to the second wave, but the 
instruments to implement the policy are taken from the third  transformation : 
(1) policy building in ever more fragmented areas of society and the economy; 
(2) neoformalism through institution building  – one of the major characteristics 
of the promotion of divergent policies 69 and through the promotion of genuine 
European values  – wrapped into categories that are familiar in the national 
context of anti-discrimination, environmental protection and consumer 
protection, though they gain a diff erent twist through Europeanisation. In these 
policy fi elds, the person appears to hold all sorts of identities exactly in the way 
Duncan Kennedy describes it. EU anti-discrimination law, EU environmental 
law and EU consumer law defi ne identities: the discriminated men and women, 
the discriminated minorities, the citizens harmed through air pollution, water 
pollution, the consumer subjected to unfair commercial practices, unfair 
contracts, the travellers aff ected by delayed or cancelled fl ights. Each of the 





 70  E.  Stein ,  ‘ Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution ’ ( 1981 )  75  AJIL 
(American Journal of Int ’ l Law)  1 – 27 . 
 71  M.  Maduro and  L.  Azoulai (eds.),  Th e Past and the Future of EU Law  – the Classics of EU 
Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty ,  Hart Publishing ,  Oxford  2010 . 
 72  Th is is behind the statement of  G.  Davies  ‘ Freedom of Contract and the Horizontal Eff ect of 
Free Movement Law ’ in  S.  Weatherill and  D.  Leczykiewicz (eds.),  Th e Involvement of EU 
Law in Private Law Relationships ,  Hart Publishing,  Oxford  2013 , p.  53 . 
 3.2. CONSTITUTIONALISATION: THE  ‘ MANDATAIRE ’ 
 Owing to the dense parallelism and overlapping of developments in the EU, it is 
more diffi  cult to assign a particular person to a particular stage of transformation 
in European law. I would like to distinguish between two stages in the formation 
of the European person, the formative stage  – which comes close to the logic 
behind the fi rst transformation  – and the ongoing stage  – in which the second 
and the third transformations are coming together. Th e fi rst could attribute 
the status of  mandataire to the European person in the meaning of Demogue, 
the second equating the European person with the  identity-based rights holder 
in the meaning of Duncan Kennedy. Each of the two demonstrates a particular 
form of constitutionalisation. 
 Th e person as  mandataire is  constitutive for the building of the European 
legal order. Th e story of the formation of a genuine legal order via the CJEU 
has been told endless times, perhaps most excitingly by E. Stein. 70 Less 
attention has been devoted to the facts behind  van Gend  & Loos and  Costa v. 
Enel . More oft en than not private parties tied together through a contract were 
deriving individual enforceable rights from a supranational treaty in order to 
challenge national statutory restrictions that impede free trade (the conclusion 
of contracts) in the then Common Market. 71 Th e European legal order could 
only develop through the decisive move from person to  mandataire . I will call 
this a  constitutional move. Th e trans-border dimension of contracting allows 
for an instrumentalisation of  ‘ contract ’ as a device to shape a legal order. 72 Th e 
CJEU instrumentalises the  mandataire for its self-defi ned objective (the genuine 
European legal order), whether or not the person behind the  mandataire gets 
what he or she wants. Th e fi nal decision is left  to the national courts. 
 Th e second and third waves of globalisation that the EU underwent between 
1986 and today have yielded ever more fragmented identity-based rights. Here, 
the constitutionalisation of private law takes two forms: the fi rst occurs via the 
upgrading of identity-based rights to a higher level of value by reference to 
human rights and fundamental rights. Th e mushrooming of human rights and 
fundamental rights nationally, in Europe and internationally renders it possible 
to give more or less each and every right  ‘ a human right or a fundamental right 
touch ’. Th e second occurs via adjudication through the CJEU as a constitutional 
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court operating in the three (and more) policy fi elds as a key actor for managing 
 ‘ diff erence ’. It is for the CJEU to develop this dimension of constitutionalisation 
by using increased references to the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Th e legal 
question is whether and to what extent these secondary EU rules grant  ‘ rights ’ 
to these  ‘ people ’. Th e technique of interpretation that the CJEU applies had 
already been foreshadowed by Demogue, Jhering, and Jellinek and transferred 
by Norbert Reich to the EU legal order. 73 
 Th e  ‘ people ’ live in constantly changing identities, from environmentalist to 
a person discriminated against by reason of their gender, and from there to a 
cheated consumer or customer. Th e CJEU connects and must connect  – because 
this is the regulatory logic  – the identity of the person to the particular policy 
fi eld from which the respective rights have to be deduced. Th e person should not 
be understood as an individualised individual;  ‘ the person ’ can easily represent 
a group of concerned private investors, such as in Mohamed Aziz, 74 or of energy 
customers, such as in RWE . 75 Her identity and the relevant policy fi eld merge 
into one. Th is is already indicated in the way the identity-based right holders are 
named  – the consumer relates to consumer protection, the environmentalist to 
environmental protection  – the discriminated to anti-discrimination. One may 
wonder whether identity-based rights herald the end of the abstract person as 
one of the basic features of the Western European legal culture. 76 
 Decision-making through adjudication is no more than a means to manage 
diff erences: diff erences in the respective policy fi eld itself in weighing consumer 
rights and the rights of the supplier or service provider, diff erences between 
policy fi elds (e.g. weighing environmental protection rights against consumer 
protection rights), but also managing diff erences between identity-based 
rights where the holder of the rights has merged with the policy fi eld into an 
indivisible conglomerate (the collective and the societal dimension) and the 
real persons standing behind the identity-based right and claiming justice 




an example. 78 Mr Mohamed Aziz belongs to the group of the  ‘ poor ’ cheated house 
owners who have signed up to mortgage contracts that allowed for expeditious 
eviction. In that sense, the  ‘ poor ’ house owners form a collective identity which 
is given rights through the CJEU. Th ese rights have gradually gained the status 
of human and fundamental rights. Th e bulk of the case law before the CJEU has 
generated a new microcosm 79  – the distribution of rights and responsibilities 
of banks and house owners around Europe in the aft ermath of the 2008 crisis. 
However, there is Mr Mohamed Aziz himself who wants to stay in his house despite 
his inability to pay the mortgage. What can be observed is that the  ‘ individual ’ 
vanishes behind the collective dimension of the confl ict  – the  ‘ weak ’ against the 
 ‘ strong ’. Th ough being the hero in the fi ght against injustice, Mr Mohamed Aziz is 
depersonalised and de-subjectifi ed at the same time. Th e EU legal order, as well 
as the political class (the European Commission, the European Parliament, the 
national governments, the national legislators), focus on the societal dimension, 
so that the individual being is merged with the policy issues that he has brought 
to the judicial and political fora. It is the irony of identity-based rights that owing 
to the merger with the policy objectives from which they derive their rights, the 
holders of these rights,  ‘ the real persons behind the right ’, are literally  ‘ vanishing ’. 
 Do they also vanish legally ? Are we observing the emergence of a 
constitutionalised private legal order without a  ‘ real ’ person, despite the fact 
that identity-based rights are a mandatory prerequisite for the shaping of such 
an order ? Or has there never been a real person in that Classical Legal Th ought 
was already based on the existence of a normative fi ction of the person ? But was 
 ‘ Th e Social ’ not meant to bring the real person with her needs to the forefront 
of political, legal and judicial attention ? National courts alone cannot bear the 
burden of re-establishing the individual; this seems to be the lesson to be drawn 
from all the public interest litigation. In managing diff erence, the judicial heroes 
appear as if they are regulatory agencies rather than problem solvers who decide 
a  ‘ case ’. Is this what Ch. Schmid meant ? Or is there a new move needed, to make 
identity-based rights  ‘ real ’ via the recognition of the right to be treated as a worker, 
consumer, as a weaker party, as a property right holder, etc. ? 
 4. CONTRACT 
 European private law demonstrates the move towards a new form of a socially 
orientated contract that refl ects the access justice paradigm and that already 
 78  H.-W.  Micklitz ,  ‘ Unfair Contract Terms  – Public Interest Litigation before European Courts 
Case C-415/11 Mohamed Aziz ’ in  V.  Colaert and  E.  Terryn (eds.),  Landmark Cases of EU 
Consumer Law  – in Honour of Jules Stuyck ,  Intersentia ,  Antwerp  2013 , pp.  615 – 634 . 
 79  I.  Domurath ,  H.-W.  Micklitz and  G.  Comparato (eds.),  ‘ Th e Over-indebtedness of 
European Consumers  – a View from Six Countries ’ , EUI Working Paper EUI-ERC  2014/08 . 
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enshrines a strong procedural dimension. Th e focus will be placed on anti-
discrimination and consumer law, although the transition might also be traced 
in B2B relations. 
 4.1.  TRANSFORMATIONS: FROM SOCIAL TO PROCEDURAL 
CONTRACTS 
 Th e impact of the three transformations can be identifi ed in the concept of 
contract. Th e move from formal rationality to material rationality in contract 
law has yielded an abundant literature on what can be grouped under the notion 
of  ‘ social contract law ’. Th e debate started in the late nineteenth century with 
the rise of labour contracts and the fi ght between employers and trade unions 
over their content, in particular, the need for minimum rights and duties to the 
benefi t of employees. With the emerging consumer society in the 1960s in the 
US and the 1970s in Europe, the debate gained new ground. Th ere have been 
attempts in French, German and Italian legal theory to use theories of labour 
contracts as a basis to understand consumer contracts. 80 Th e focus has been on 
how to justify and legitimise statutory intervention into freedom of contract/
freedom to contract. 
 Th e development of EU law and EU legal theories on labour and consumer 
contracts took a diff erent path, which is linked to the design of  ‘ Th e Social ’ in a 
supranational entity such as the European Union. Th e timid attempts to build 
or to transform the EU into a social welfare state or, at least, to integrate social 
elements into labour law and consumer law were a limited success. Th eoretical 
justifi cations and normative quests largely remained an academic exercise, at 
least when compared to developed social welfare state models such as the Nordic 
countries or Austria, France and Germany. Usually the theoretical patterns 
were taken from the nation state context; the changing role of the state and the 
particular character of the EU as a market state were not taken into account. 
And even if it was taken into account, there was limited preparedness to draw 
out the implications of the EU as a market state and as a laboratory and to take 
the diff erences between the nation state and the post-nation state seriously. 81 
 Th is does not mean that labour contracts were not subject to the second and 
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turned out to be anti-discrimination policy. It needed, this is Duncan Kennedy ’ s 
argument, a further move in the globalisation process, from the second to the 
third wave, to break down the rather well-shielded realm of national family 
laws which stabilised gender discrimination. Richard M ü nch, 82 one of the few 
sociologists who studied the European integration process over recent decades, 
goes as far as to argue that anti-discrimination policy constitutes a genuine 
European value. In fact, hand in hand with the CJEU, the EU played a key role 
in challenging gender discrimination in many types of labour contracts 83 and, 
indeed, beyond labour contracts. Th e anti-discrimination principle cuts across 
the boundaries of the economy and society. 
 Th e second major domain of EU socially-minded contract law making 
is consumer law. Once again, there is a diff erence between the consumer 
protection policy of the Member States during the heyday of the social welfare 
paradigm and the consumer policy of the EU  – with a much lower emphasis on 
protection and much higher demand for instrumentalising the consumer and 
the transnational consumer contract to contribute to the shaping of the internal 
market. In the aft ermath of the Single European Act, the EU managed to adopt 
a fi rst generation of consumer law directives and regulations, which regulates 
the modalities of contract conclusion, provides for the control of standard terms 
and commercial practices and lays down rules on particular types of consumer 
contracts, such as package tours, time sharing and consumer sales. It was only 
gradually that it became clear that European consumer law diff ers from Member 
States ’ consumer  protection law. 84 While the form resembles national consumer 
law, the substance is gradually changing. 85 Viewed through the lenses of Duncan 
Kennedy, it is the third wave of globalisation which shines through and which 
gains more ground in the 1980s and 1990s. 
 In the second generation of European consumer law, the impact of the 
third wave of globalisation can be identifi ed more clearly. Th is is what I term, 
tentatively, the move from the  social to  procedural contract, in line with the move 
from formal to material (Weber) to procedural rationality (Luhmann, Teubner). 
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It can be felt already in the fi rst generation of EU consumer law, highlighted in 
the decision to leave off er and acceptance untouched but to heavily regulate the 
pre- and the post-contractual stage. 86 Prior to contract conclusion, the EU has 
adopted a whole series of information duties in which contract and commercial 
practice come together; whereas, in the post-contractual phase, the EU requires 
eff ective remedies. Read together, these measures downplay the centrality of 
consensus. In this sense, it might be possible to interpret consumer policy as 
proceduralising contract law. Th e EU regulates all important aspects of the 
contract except the conclusion of the contract. Th e most obvious development 
is the involvement of the EU in regulating sectoral markets, which in contract 
law categories is a move from sales to services. Since the adoption of the Single 
European Act, the EU has focused on liberalising and privatising former state 
monopolies. It needed the third generation of sector-related EU rules before 
the consumer-customer attracted political attention. Today, there is a whole set 
of EU rules shielding the consumer-customer against potential harmful eff ects 
of the liberalisation and (partial) privatisation of former state monopolies in 
the fi eld of telecommunications, postal services, energy, public transport, and 
banking and fi nance. 
 Why proceduralised contracts ? By examining regulated markets, one 
observes a fragmented body of EU rules, including in the fi eld of contract law. 
Sector-specifi c contract law rules pay tribute to the specifi c rationality governing 
the respective sector. Th ey regulate 87 the contract from cradle to grave. Th ere 
are no established rules of law pertaining to, for example, a telecommunication 
or energy contract. Th e rules and their meaning can only be comprehended if 
they are embedded into the process of the making of the rules downwards from 
the directives and regulations through informal rule-making in the regulatory 
agencies and the management of the confl ict resolution. 
 Th e CJEU has oft en adjudicated anti-discrimination issues and decided on 
the fi rst generation of consumer law. What is true for facts behind claims to 
market access is equally true for anti-discrimination claims. Most of the cases 
involve a contractual dimension. Th e parties to the contract feel discriminated 
against owing to unequal treatment resulting from unequal pay or from multiple 
protean dimensions of indirect discrimination. Whilst the focus in CJEU 
judgments is quite oft en on the  ‘ person ’, the women or the men or transsexuals, 
the economic dimension of the discrimination is enshrined in the contract rules 
themselves. Th is is simply the other side of identity-based rights. In consumer 
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Brothers and the Euro-crisis. In more than 40 preliminary references, the CJEU 
had to adjudicate on standard contract terms in consumer credit contracts, 
consumer sales contracts and mortgage contracts. Th e ever denser set of CJEU 
rulings allows for the development of an autonomous understanding of the 
control over standard terms. Similar to the case law on anti-discrimination in 
labour contracts, the question is whether and to what extent the CJEU is about to 
constitutionalise consumer contracts. Labelling the move of the CJEU towards 
the protection of employees, of the discriminated or of consumers, as giving 
voice to  ‘ Th e Social ’, does not give the full picture. Th is is owing to the diff erent 
function  ‘ Th e Social ’ plays in the EU in comparison to Member States. My own 
reading very much stresses the diff erence between the distributive function  – 
social justice  – and the access function  – what I call access justice. Th e EU is 
setting minimum standards of access justice. It remains for the Member States 
to go beyond that minimum. 
 4.2.  CONSTITUTIONALISATIONS: OPEN AND HIDDEN 
FORMS 
 I would like to distinguish between open and hidden forms of 
constitutionalisation. Open forms are those wherein the CJEU directly refers 
to human rights or fundamental rights in anti-discrimination and consumer 
law; hidden forms are those in which there is no direct reference but where 
I understand the interventions of the CJEU as of constitutive and constitutional 
importance for the European legal order. Combined with Ch. Schmid ’ s distinction 
between the CJEU as a supreme court in private law and a constitutional court, it 
helps to drawn a line between  ‘ normal ’ types of confl icts that have to be resolved 
in the realms of private law litigation and  ‘ constitutional ’ types of confl icts that 
have an impact on the notion and the concept of contract. 
 Th e most visible form of constitutionalisation takes place in the fi eld of anti-
discrimination law. 88 Here the CJEU has played and still plays a key role. In the 
early days of the EU, the CJEU did not invoke human rights, but used Article 141 
of the TFEU as a tool to constitutionalise gender discrimination, fi rst in direct 
forms of discrimination through unequal pay, later through indirect forms of 
discrimination. By means of the four directives and the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, anti-discrimination has turned into a value system that governs the EU 
legal order and that is no longer limited to labour contracts. Th e key diffi  culty is 
how to distil from the mass of decisions dealing with all sorts of discrimination 
those contractual rights that could and should be granted a  ‘ constitutional status ’. 
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Such contractual obligations would thus no longer be subject to change through 
legislation. Th e far-reaching implications of such consequences on the political 
and democratic systems of (Member) States are widely discussed.  Test-Achats 
documents the willingness of the CJEU to use primary Community law (not 
yet the Charter) in order to set aside residual forms of gender discrimination in 
insurance contracts. 
 In consumer law,  Mohamed Aziz triggered an entirely new development. 
Mr Aziz was evicted from his home as he did not pay his mortgage. Th e case 
reached the CJEU via the preliminary reference procedure. At stake were the 
contract terms in the loan agreement that allowed the creditor to engage in 
enforcement proceedings, in which the potential unfairness of the contract 
terms could no longer be invoked. Neither the CJEU nor the Advocate General 
refers to Article 34(3) of the Charter on Fundamental Rights, which could have 
been used as a basis to establish a right to  ‘ housing ’. However, the CJEU and the 
Advocate General were ready by indirect means to give housing a particular 
quasi-constitutional standing. Since  Aziz , the constitutionalisation process has 
gained pace, in particular through the preparedness of the CJEU to address 
openly the constitutional dimension of consumer contract laws in  S á nchez 
Morcillo and  Ku š ionov á . 89 However, unlike anti-discrimination law, the number 
of available judgments in which the CJEU addresses explicitly the human rights 
or fundamental rights dimension is still rather limited. Th erefore, it is diffi  cult 
to draw general conclusions. Th ere is no counterpart to  Test-Achats . It is far 
from clear how far the CJEU would go in declaring EU consumer directives 
and regulations as infringing the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Th e much-
debated Consumer Rights Directive, 2011/83/EU, with its mix of upgrading and 
downgrading consumer rights, has not brought about any clarifi cation. 90 It is 
plain that each and every consumer right, and each and every mandatory term 
in secondary Community law cannot be shielded against legislative change. 
 Th e notion of  hidden constitutionalisation in consumer law builds on the 
idea that the concept of contract is constitutive, foundational and, therefore, 
constitutional in a legal order that reaches beyond the state. Th e most amazing 
developments are taking place at the pre-contractual and the post-contractual 
stage. I would like to place emphasis on the case law that deals with the relationship 
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sales promotion). Th ree trends deserve highlighting: the fading line between 
advertising and a contractual off er, secondly, the  ‘ merger ’ of commercial practices 
and standard terms respectively and, thirdly, the merger of individual and 
collective terms. Th e scope of Article 13 of the Brussels Convention (Article 15 
of the Brussels I Regulation) has given rise to extensive case law with regard to 
whether and to what extent sending sweepstake competitions to consumers can 
be regarded as a  ‘ contract ’ allowing him or her to sue the company in his or her 
place of domicile. Th e issue has been referred on several occasions to the CJEU. 
In  Gabriel , 91 the CJEU held that winning a prize and ordering goods means that 
a contract is concluded, whereas in  Engler it made clear 92 that winning a prize 
without ordering goods means that no contract is concluded . At fi rst sight the 
CJEU takes a clear stand: if the consumer has fi lled out the coupon and orders 
the products, a contract is concluded and Article 13 of the Brussels Convention/
Article 15 of the Brussels I Regulation applies. If the consumer has received the 
sweepstake but has not responded to the off er to order products or if the trader 
has not made such an off er to place an order, Articles 13 or 15 do not apply owing 
to the lack of reciprocal obligation. From a marketing point of view the situation 
is relatively similar in both scenarios. Th e consumer must react: either to order 
the product or to order the prize. Th e distinction of the CJEU seems artifi cial, 
as the applicability of Articles 13 or 15 depends on the prior sales of goods. Th e 
CJEU had to respond a third time to a similar question, this time in relation to 
the Brussel I Regulation. According to  Ilsinger , 93 sweepstake competitions can 
be regarded as a contract even when they are independent of the sale of goods. 
Th e CJEU observed that Article 15(1) of Regulation 44/2001 94 is not identical to 
Article 13 of the Brussels Convention: Article 15(1) is draft ed in more general 
terms. However, as to the requirement that a  ‘ contract ’ exists between vendor 
and consumer, Article 15 of the Regulation has to be interpreted like Article 13 
of the Convention. Th e Court fi rst looks at its  Gabriel and  Engler case law and 
then makes an important diff erentiation. Th ere can indeed be a contract when 
the vendor has declared that she is willing, without conditions, to pay the prize 
at issue to consumers who request it. It is for the national court to determine 
whether that requirement is fulfi lled in the dispute at hand. 
 In a conventional understanding, commercial practices and standard terms 
belong to diff erent categories. Commercial practices (Directives 2005/29 
and 2006/114) 95 are to be regarded as market regulation, enforced via public 
authorities (in the vast majority of the Member States) making sure that 
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competition between companies is not unduly aggressive and unfair. Standard 
terms contracts (Directive 93/13) 96 are to be regarded as a means to ensure 
fairness in contractual relations, between businesses and consumers, but also to 
a more limited extent between businesses. 97 Th e CJEU, however, systematically 
blurs the line between the two fi elds of law. Both directives within the context 
have large open-ended clauses. On the one hand, there are non-binding terms, 
which contradict the principle of unfairness as laid down in Article 3 Directive 
93/13/EEC. On the other hand, there is the law of unfair commercial practices. 
Th e scope of Directive 2005/29/EC is quite broad. 98 It covers even individualised 
advertising addressing one single consumer only. 99 Th us, Directive 2005/29/EC 
mutates into a catch-all mechanism, which covers advertising, sales promotion 
and standard contract terms. 
 According to Article 3(2), Directive 2005/29/EC is  ‘ without prejudice to 
contract law and, in particular, to the rules on the validity, formation or eff ect 
of a contract ’. 100 But the CJEU has also emphasised in  Pereni č ova that  ‘ a fi nding 
that a commercial practice is unfair is one element among others on which the 
competent court may base its assessment of the unfairness of contractual terms 
under Article 4(1) of Directive 93/13 ’, 101 provided there is an unfair commercial 
practice and the scope of application of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive is 
relevant. Th e individual consumer can be helped only if the unfair commercial 
practice itself can be referred to in order to evaluate the unfairness of a contract 
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 Antwerp  2009 , para. 3.20. 
 105  Case C-381 and C-385/14 ,  Jorge Sales Sinu é s v. Caixabank SA ,  judgment of  14 January 2016 
(AG Szpunar). 
how this interaction should occur. Th e Advocate General and the CJEU 
overcame the dividing line between the two fi elds of law by highlighting that the 
control of unfair terms also applies where the author draft ed the clause with a 
view to its  possible use:  ‘ It is therefore not necessary for general use to be actually 
or certainly planned ’. 102 By this manoeuvre, the control of unfair terms shift s 
to an earlier stage of the examination, thus paving the way for the inclusion 
of commercial acts, as far as the latter meet the formal requirements of being 
treated as  ‘ contract terms ’. 
 What are the consequences ? Can contract clauses be eff ective even if they 
have to be classifi ed as unfair or misleading commercial practices ? An important 
distinction must be drawn between the potential impact of unfair commercial 
practices on  individual contracts, in which the validity of one term might depend 
on a coherent interpretation of the two areas of the law, and the potential impact 
of unfair commercial practices on  collective actions. Th e CJEU has not yet had 
to decide the applicability of Article 4(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC to collective 
actions. It has insisted on restricting the scope of the  contra proferentem rule to 
individual litigation, 103 without, however, noticing the necessity of achieving a 
consistent interpretation in individual and collective litigation. In light of the 
well-known tendency of the CJEU to develop a common approach to diff erent 
fi elds of law, it might not be far-fetched to assume that the CJEU might be ready 
to aim at consistency also in the rules governing the control of contract terms by 
individual or via collective actions. Th is would mean, in particular, that the reach 
and application of Article 4 of Directive 93/13/EEC should extend to collective 
litigation. 104  Sinu é s 105 points exactly in such a direction. Advocate General 
Szpunar confi rms the compatibility of a Spanish rule that suspends an individual 
action until the fi nal decision is reached in an action for an injunction. 
 5. PROPERTY 
 Property is a wonderful blueprint for analysing the transformation process 
under the three waves of globalisation. Its absolute character has undergone deep 
changes with the rise of  ‘ Th e Social ’. Th e primary venue for developments at the 
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Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common 
European level, however, seems to be the ECtHR, whereas the CJEU promotes 
the development of property rights as political rights. 
 5.1.  TRANSFORMATIONS: MAJOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 
MEMBER STATES AND THE EU 
 Th e waves of transformation can easily be reconstructed in the way property 
has been conceptualised, though this has occurred to a very diff erent degree at 
the nation state level in comparison to the European Union level. In Classical 
Legal Th ought  ‘ property ’ is regarded as an absolute right that entitles the right 
holder to exclude others. 106 Whilst this overall position still holds true and is 
defended forcefully by many legal scholars, the rise of  ‘ Th e Social ’ has yielded a 
new understanding of property. On the one hand, the absolute character of the 
right to property has been relativised. Th is is most outspoken in German law, 
where property is submitted to a kind of social compatibility test, in German 
 ‘ Sozialbinding des Eigentums ’  – perhaps something like social obligations of 
private property ownership. On the other hand, inspired by the move towards 
 ‘ Th e Social ’, legislatures and more prominently courts in numerous Member 
States have extended the notion of property in order to include social property 
rights, in particular pension rights, that are granted by public law and based on 
joint contributions from the employer and the employee. 107 
 Th e situation is very diff erent at the EU level. As is well known, the Treaty does 
not deal with private law matters. However, according to Article 345 of the TFEU, 
 ‘ Th e Treaties shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing 
the system of property ownership ’. Th is leaves the regulation of property in the 
hands of the Member States. CJEU case law on Article 345 of the TFEU is very 
limited and mostly relates to expropriation. Since 2000, the right to property 
is governed by Article 17 of the Charter on Fundamental Rights. Property 
is protected, but very much in line with the development in major countries 
around the world, since it is or can be submitted to (social) restrictions. Th e EU 
legal order has barred the EU legislature from taking measures to harmonise 
property law, though maybe one should add to  openly harmonise property law. 
Th is is one reason among others why the Draft  Common Frame of Reference 
(but not the Common European Sales Law) failed, contrary to what the draft ers 
intended, to harmonise the notion of property within the scope of contract and 




European Sales Law /* COM/2011/0635 fi nal – 2011/0284 (COD), which delegates questions 
of ownership to the European international private law rules. 
 109  Directive 93/13/EC [1993] OJ L210/29. 
 110  Directive 2008/122/EC [2009] OJ L33/10 and Directive 2014/17/EU [2014] OJ L60/34. 
 111  S. Van Erp /B. Akkermans above n. 51; now  Ch.  Von Bar ,  Gemeineurop ä isches Sachenrecht , 
vol.  1 ,  Ch. Beck ,  Munich  2015 . 
 112  H.-W.  Micklitz and  S.  Weatherill ,  European Economic Law: Casebook ,  Dartmouth , 
 London  1997 , p.  303 , with references from the CJEU. 
 Secondary Union law on consumer contract law, in particular, has led to a 
form of  ‘ hidden ’ or  ‘ indirect ’ harmonisation in that the diff erent regulations and 
directives presuppose the existence of  ‘ property ’, though linked to the modalities 
of contract conclusion, of contract or of contractual and tortious remedies. To 
give one example from the Product Liability Directive, Directive  85/374, 109 
Article 9 states:  ‘ For the purpose of Article 1, “damage” means: (b) damage to, 
or destruction of, any item of  property other than the defective product itself  ’. 
Numerous other examples can easily be found, for example in the Timeshare 
Directive 2008/122 or in the Mortgage Directive 2014/17. 110  ‘ Property ’ is, 
however, nowhere defi ned. Th us, the EU legislature circumvents the deeper 
problem that results from divergent understandings of property in national legal 
orders, not only between common law and continental law, but also between 
the diff erent continental interpretations of property. 111 It would be a valuable 
exercise to distil from the diff erent EU directives and the relevant CJEU case law 
the reconceptualisation of property. Th is would also permit us to understand 
whether and to what extent the subject matter  – the respective consumer 
contract law directive or the Product Liability Directive  – provides for an EU 
understanding of property in terms of the Classical Legal Th ought or in terms of 
 ‘ Th e Social ’ or in terms of  ‘ neoformalism ’. 
 Th e situation is diff erent with regard to intellectual property rights. In the 
Treaty of Rome intellectual property rights appear as one possible reason to justify 
restrictions on trade in goods under Article 36 of the TFEU. Th e question was 
whether Article 345 of the TFEU covers property rights as well. Th is somewhat 
ambiguous starting position has enabled the CJEU to draw a distinction between 
the status of intellectual property rights and the exercise of intellectual property 
rights. 112 Long before the insertion of an explicit competence on intellectual 
property rights in the Treaty of Lisbon (Article 118), the EU adopted a whole 
series of regulations and directives dealing with trade marks, copyrights, 
enforcement of IP and data protection rights, biotechnological inventions and 
topographies of semiconductor products. Contrary to Article 345 of the TFEU, 
there is a growing case law of the CJEU that allows us to locate the development 
of European intellectual property rights law through regulations and directives 
into the three waves of transformation. 
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 At fi rst sight, it appears that the European law of intellectual property rights 
fi ts into Classical Legal Th ought, into the formal establishment of a European 
legal order, based on (intellectual) property. However, this does not seem to 
be correct. Already the distinction between status and exercise of intellectual 
property rights goes beyond such an understanding. Th e CJEU ’ s case law aimed 
to establish an internal market in which national property rights cannot be used 
to partition national markets artifi cially and shield them against competition. 
Whilst this policy could be interpreted, though in a somewhat simplifi ed way, as 
a foundational market building exercise very much in line with Classical Legal 
Th ought transferred to the EU, the strong engagement of the EU legislature into 
expanding intellectual property rights calls for a diff erent explanation. Here, the 
link to the third transformation is more obvious. Th e proliferation and expansion 
of IP rights, promoted and forced on developing countries by Western global 
players  – the USA and the EU  – could be seen as one of the characteristics of 
the third transformation and, as such, the EU ’ s expansion in this sphere both 
naturally follows from and confi rms the third transformation. 
 5.2.  CONSTITUTIONALISATION: POLITICISED 
MULTI-LEVEL 
 Quite a number of Member States have given  ‘ property ’ a constitutional 
status. 113 Owing to the lack of directives and regulations, constitutionalising 
property remained in the hands of the national courts. At the European level, 
it seems possible to distinguish between four types of case law according to 
their legal source: fi rst, constitutionalisation of property rights via the CJEU 
within and outside harmonising measures; secondly, constitutionalisation via 
Article 17 of the Charter which has upgraded property and recognised it as a 
fundamental right; thirdly, constitutionalisation via the ECtHR; and fourthly, 
constitutionalisation of intellectual property rights, the only area where there is 
suffi  cient CJEU case law that could be used to distil  ‘ principles ’. 114 Setting aside 
the diff erences between the legal sources of constitutionalisation and focusing 
on the substance of the constitutionalisation of property, there seems to be a 
clear divide between national constitutional courts/ECtHR on the one hand, and 




 115  See the contributions in  C.  Kilpatrick and  B.  De Witte (eds.),  ‘ Social Rights in Times of 
Crisis in the Eurozone: Th e Role of Fundamental Rights ’ Challenges ’ ,  EUI Working Paper 
 2014/05 . 
 116  A. Nannery ,  ‘ Th e  “ Social-Euro Crisis ” Cases of the European Court of Human Rights 
in the European Sovereign Debt Crisis ’ , LLM EUI Florence 2016, who refers to  Koufaki 
and ADEDY v. Greece , nos. 57665/12 and 57657/12,  § 6 – 7, 7 May 2013, ECLI:CE:ECHR:
2013:0507DEC005766512;  Da Concei ç ã o Mateus v. Portugal and Santos Janu á rio v. Portugal , 
nos. 57725/12 and 62235/12, 8 October 2013, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2013:1008DEC006223512; 
 N.K.M. v. Hungary and R.Sz. v. Hungary , no. 66529/11, 14 May 2013, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2013:
0514JUD006652911;  Sulcs v. Latvia , no. 42923/10, 6 December 2011, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2011:
1206DEC004292310. 
 117  O. De Schutter and  M. Salomon ,  Legal Brief prepared for the Special Committee of the 
Hellenic Parliament on the Audit of the Greek Debt , 15 June 2015;  O. De Schutter and 
 M. Salomon,  Economic Policy Conditionality, Socio-economic Rights and International Legal 
Responsibility: the Case of Greece 2010–15 , available at:  < http://cadtm.org/Legal-Brief-
Prepared-for-the > accessed 23.09.2016. 
to limit the absolute character of property rights through the integration of  ‘ Th e 
Social ’, whereas the CJEU, to the contrary, tends to proceduralise property rights, 
thereby turning property into a political right to participation. 
 Whilst this could be called a general tendency for the overall period of  ‘ Th e 
Social ’, the promotion of national legislative measures to diminish social rights 
in the aft ermath of the 2008 Euro-crisis paints a more ambiguous picture. 115 In 
the light of the reluctance of national courts to protect social property rights, 
victims of austerity policies sought support before the ECtHR. To date, four 
cases from Greece, Portugal, Hungary and Latvia, have reached the Court in 
Strasbourg. 116 In the fi rst three instances the plaintiff s question the legality of 
cuts to their pension rights; in the Latvian case changes of the law on maternity 
and sickness insurance form the core of the confl ict. Only the Hungarian 
plaintiff s were successful. Th e Court criticised in harsh language the 98 per cent 
tax on severance payments. One might wonder to what extent the plaintiff s are 
 ‘ weak parties ’ that deserve protection or whether these rights are privileges of 
a rather small group in society. Duncan Kennedy ’ s fi nding that everybody can 
turn herself into a weak party springs to mind. 
 More far-reaching proposals to tie the overall crisis management of the 
Troika to the purported respect for social human rights remained unfulfi lled. 117 
Such a new policy would require diffi  cult decisions between groups in society 
in order to determine those who are  ‘ really ’ in need and those that can  ‘ bear ’ 
economic losses. Th e diff erent outcome of the four ECtHR judgments and the 
diff erentiation between the four cases seem to fi t into such a picture. A crisis 
management that takes social human rights fully into account points towards the 
third transformation and the overall  – highly debated question  – whether human 
rights could serve as a universal order that even trumps national sovereignty. 
Th e Greek, Portuguese and Hungarian parliaments would no longer be free to 
decide where to cut and whom to choose as a target group. Social human rights 
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would not only limit national sovereignty of the  ‘ takers ’ but also of the  ‘ givers ’. 
Th e result would be an international property rights management that defi nes 
how  ‘ property ’ should be conceived in a globalised world, largely exercised by 
the judiciary. 118 
 Th ere is perhaps one particular type of case before the Court in Luxembourg 
that could be read and understood as defending  ‘ Th e Social ’ through the 
advocacy of fundamental rights. Th is is again the case law that was triggered 
by  Mohammed Aziz . Here, the Court is involved in post-crisis management 
and refers to the right to housing in order to smooth the potential impact of 
the Euro-crisis on mortgage debtors. Th ere is defi nitely a  ‘ social ’ element in 
the case law insofar as the CJEU restricts the absolute right of the banks to 
evict from their homes those who are not able to pay their debts. 119 Th e CJEU 
is reminding European society at large of the hundreds of thousands of home 
owners and creditors whose existence is jeopardised and who could and should 
not be regarded as inevitable  ‘ collateral damage ’. While this fi nding might sound 
promising to those who would like to see the CJEU turning into a social court, 
it should not be forgotten that the CJEU case law is far from consistent.  Alemo-
Herron , though rather unique, stands for a totally diff erent position, where the 
CJEU defended in crude language freedom of contract, using fundamental 
rights language to test the compatibility of Member States ’ legislation beyond 
the minimum level of harmonisation. 120 
 However, there is more to say about the social or non-social character of the 
CJEU case law.  Mohamed Aziz read together with  Centros demonstrates how 
the CJEU is transforming  ‘ property ’ rights into  ‘ political ’ rights. Here the link 
to the third transformation becomes clear. Let us assume that Mr Aziz enjoys a 
property right under the Charter of Fundamental Rights that allows him and his 
family to remain in the family home without paying their mortgage repayments. 
Let us further assume that the Danish citizens, who were granted the right to 
establish a company in the UK, are equally granted a kind of  ‘ proprietary right ’. 
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 124  See the outspoken  M. Bobek ,  ‘ Why Th ere is No Principle of  “ Procedural Autonomy ” of the 
Member States ’ in  Micklitz and  De Witte , n. 27 above, p. 305. 
and to the third transformation ? What matters in light of the paradigms set out 
at the beginning of this chapter is the transnational dimension to property rights. 
Th e conceptualisation of property reaches beyond the boundaries of a particular 
national legal order. Th e CJEU addresses fi rst and foremost the national 
authorities in Spain and other bail-out countries: the national courts but also 
the governments and to some extent even the EU institutions themselves. Th e 
CJEU cannot decide the case, it only triggers a procedure, a process, in the home 
countries of the plaintiff s, where the claimants are given a voice in the political 
concert. In that sense  Centros and  Aziz stand in a long line of CJEU case law 
where individual rights promote the transnationalisation of the nation state. 122 
Th is is exactly the kind of laboratory that is characteristic of the European legal 
order and the European  ‘ market ’ state. 
 6. REMEDIES 
 With respect to remedies, unlike with the other pillars, an explanation is needed 
about how competences are shared in the Treaty and how the EU legislature, 
with the support of the CJEU, managed to interfere with remedies. Th e shift  in 
perspective paves the way for highlighting the considerable shift  in the design of 
remedies in the second and third transformation, from eff ectiveness to managing 
diff erences in a multi-level supranational entity like the EU. 
 Th e European legal order is based on a clear division of responsibilities, in 
which the EU has been granted greater competences to regulate the internal 
market and any other policy fi eld provided the Member States have delegated 
their competence to the EU. Th e principle of enumerated powers was confi rmed 
in the Treaty of Lisbon. However, the responsibility of the Member States to 
enforce EU law has never been explicit in the Treaties. Th is does not mean that 
the Member States are totally free. In  Rewe and  Comet the CJEU confi rmed the 
procedural autonomy of Member States in enforcing EU law provided they meet 
the principle of equivalence and eff ectiveness. 123 Th ere is an abundant case law 
in which the CJEU has given shape to the two principles. Some argue that the 
principles are no more than a chimera, fi lled with holes like a Swiss cheese. 124 It 
is certainly true that, in particular, the principle of eff ectiveness has given rise to 
the EU ’ s shaping of the boundaries of procedural autonomy. Th e adoption of the 
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Charter of Fundamental Rights with its emphasis on eff ective judicial protection 
in Article 47 might even accelerate the pace of EU intrusion into the foundations 
of the Treaty insofar as there is clearly a constitutional dimension, provided one 
accepts the rhetoric of the CJEU which understands the EU legal order as a 
 ‘ constitutional order ’. Article 47 has to be read together with Articles 6 and 13 
of the ECHR. 
 With the exception of competition law, EU rules on the enforcement of 
private law, whether traditional or regulatory, can only be found in secondary 
community law. Competition law holds a prominent position. Article 103 of 
the TFEU provides a basis for concentrating enforcement in the hands of the 
Commission. 125 As the EU has no genuine competences in traditional private 
law matters, regulatory private law is based on the internal market competence. 
In this regard, the CJEU has developed the principle of the so-called annex 
competence. Th erefore the EU may touch upon  ‘ remedies ’ provided there is an 
inherent link to the particular substance in question. Th ese bits and pieces 126 
make it hard to identify common denominators in the shaping of rights, remedies 
and procedure, to use van Gerven ’ s terminology. It will have to be shown that the 
CJEU is gradually developing genuine European remedies that do not fi t into a 
traditional understanding of private law remedies. 
 6.1.  THE TRANSFORMATIONS: FROM EFFECTIVENESS 
TO DELIBERATION 
 EU law has given private law a decisive position that fi ts nicely into the 
characteristics of the second and third transformation. Th is is true both with 
regard to the principle of eff ectiveness and the principle of equivalence. Th e 
principle of eff ectiveness gains ground with the rise of  ‘ Th e Social ’. A goal-
orientated policy that aims at improving  ‘ social justice ’ requires remedies that are 
suitable for the achievement of the politically agreed objectives. Th at is why the 
principle of eff ectiveness can turn into an extremely powerful tool in the hands 
of courts and judges as the self-proclaimed heroes of the post-nation state. It is 
more or less open-ended as it is bound only to the policy (consumer protection, 




transparent contract ? What is a  ‘ just ’ contract ? Th e largely recognised and widely 
discussed move of the legislature from  ‘ rules ’ to  ‘ principles ’ enhances the power 
of the judiciary. Th is is even more so in the European context, where political 
compromises in the legislative procedure are hidden in sometimes contradictory 
recitals in the preamble to the piece of legislation. However, the principle of 
eff ectiveness reaches beyond  ‘ Th e Social ’ and touches upon all policy fi elds 
that enshrine a private law dimension, including the area of regulated markets. 
Th e diff erentiation of policy fi elds, consumer policy, anti-discrimination policy, 
but also telecommunication policy, energy policy, transport policy, banking and 
fi nance policy, each institutionally coupled to a Directorate, a Commissioner and 
the cabinets behind him or her, demonstrates that the principle of eff ectiveness 
cannot have the same core meaning across the various policy fi elds but is bound 
to a particular sectoral rationality. 128 
 Th e principle of equivalence introduced a new layer into the world of rights, 
remedies and procedure, as early as 1976 when  Rewe and  Comet were decided. 129 
Here the CJEU refers to the multi-level structure of the European legal order. 
One might understand the principle of equivalence as originating from the 
prohibition on discriminating against EU law. Th e available rights, remedies and 
procedures in the Member States serve as the comparator for the enforcement 
of EU law. Such a perspective does not exist in national legal systems. Rights, 
remedies and procedures in various policy fi elds might be compared with each 
other, but not across national borders. Th us, whilst the multi-level dimension is 
constitutive for the European legal order, the early move of the CJEU towards 
testing equivalence fi ts nicely into the perspective of the third transformation, 
in particular adjudication through the CJEU as a constitutional court, operating 
across various levels (EU and national) and various policy fi elds as the key actor 
for  ‘ managing diff erences ’ between rights, remedies and procedure in the EU 
and the Member States. 130 
 6.2.  CONSTITUTIONALISATION: BREAKING PRIVATE LAW 
BOUNDARIES 
 Managing diff erence does not only imply the need for balancing, 131 but also 
to integrate into the means of enforcement the multi-level structure of the 
 128  As to  ‘ rationality ’ , see  A.  Fischer-Lescano and  G.  Teubner ,  ‘ Regime-Collisions: Th e Vain 
Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law ’ ( 2004 )  25  Michigan Journal of 
Int ’ l Law  999 – 1046 . 
 129  See n. 123 above. 
 130  M.  Amstutz ,  ‘ In-Between Worlds: Marleasing and the Emergence of Interlegality in Legal 
Reasoning ’ ( 2005 )  11  ELJ  766 – 784 . 
 131  See the contribution of  D.  Kennedy and  N.  Reich  in  R.  Brownsword and others (eds.),  Th e 
Foundations of European Private Law ,  Hart Publishing ,  Oxford  2011 . 
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EU. Broken down to the level of private law, it becomes increasingly evident 
that the CJEU is opening up established boxes and distinctions, overcoming 
the diff erences between substance and procedure, questioning public and 
private, linking the eff ects of collective remedies to individual contracts, going 
beyond privity and integrating those that are aff ected by private law relations, 
third parties outside contractual relations, the positioning of the contract 
in a broader network, the economic role of supply chains and their eff ect on 
contractual relations. Managing diff erence in such a broad understanding yields 
proceduralisation as the outstanding feature. It is here where the case law of the 
CJEU gains constitutional importance. 
 Th e case law that I am going to analyse originates from various policy fi elds: 
consumer protection rules, environmental protection and anti-discrimination. 
All cases result from preliminary reference procedures and all cases have a 
particular factual and legal background. However, putting the bits and pieces 
of the widespread judgments together reveals a kind of a  ‘ structure ’, or more 
cautiously worded  ‘ generalities ’, which are constitutive for the European private 
law order. In less metaphorical terms, the bits and pieces are the substance and 
subject-related directives and the sometimes remote judgments of the CJEU: on 
consumer sales ( Putz/Weber ), 132 on unfair contract terms ( Mohamed Aziz ), on 
fi nancial services ( Bankinter ) ,133 on anti-discrimination ( Feryn ) ,134 on emission 
standards of cars ( Janecek ) 135 and on property rights ( Scarlet ). 136 It is tempting 
to limit the importance to the respective policy fi eld, be it consumer sales or 
emission standards. Such an approach necessarily runs the risk of getting lost 
in details and frictions between national and EU law. Th is should be left  to legal 
doctrinal analysis. Th e CJEU should not enter into too many doctrinal details 
and should focus instead much more on its role as a constitutional court. My 
argument is this: distilling from the cases that are spread over the various policy 
fi elds, the elements that are constitutive for opening up a new perspective that 
transcends established boxes, reveals the constitutional importance of the 
respective judgments, notwithstanding the question whether and to what extent 
it is doctrinally possible to transfer the  Janecek doctrine from environmental law 
to fi nancial services. 137 Th erefore, I attribute to the judgments a landmark status. 
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 Institutionelle Finanzmarktaufsicht und Verbraucherschutz: Eine rechtsvergleichende 
Untersuchung der Regelungssysteme in Deutschland, Italien, Schweden, dem Vereinigten 




 A consensus on the public/private divide is gradually vanishing. What 
does this mean with regard to rights, remedies and procedures ? In order to 
understand the move, it is necessary to go back to the EU ’ s logic of regulating 
markets. Financial services may serve as a blueprint here. MiFID I and MiFID II 
not only demonstrate how the EU is getting an ever tighter grip on fi nancial 
products through granting supervisory and monitoring powers to national and 
European agencies, but also the development in fi nancial services law indicates 
clearly how the deeper regulatory intervention aff ects and shapes private law 
relations. 138 Th e focal point of the debate is business conduct rules and their 
classifi cation as either private or public or even both. For insiders in the fi eld, 
the problem is well known. In  Bankinter , however, the CJEU had for the fi rst 
time the opportunity to initiate a debate as to whether EU fi nancial rules laid 
down in MiFID I and MiFID II require the Member States to provide adequate 
remedies that are suitable for the enforcement of potential rights that are granted 
to private investors. Much is open here, doctrinally speaking. Th e crucial move 
is the holistic perspective of enforcement, breaking down the clear distinction 
between regulating markets through public agencies and regulating contracts 
through private law. 139 Strangely enough  Janecek fi ts into that picture. Here, the 
CJEU granted a private individual who suff ered from the failure to observe car 
emission standards in the city of Munich the right to claim an action plan that 
was apt to bring the emission gradually into line with EU law requirements. 
EU law in regulated markets is full of obligations imposed on Member States 
and regulated agencies to develop surveillance and monitoring plans in order 
to make sure that the objectives  – usually a combination of market integration 
and social regulation (broadly understood)  – are fully respected. Th erefore 
 Janecek inserts a new layer of enforcement, one where private parties push 
public authorities into action. Dutch courts have used the same line of argument 
to grant environmental organisations standing against the Dutch state to take 
appropriate action against climate change. 140 However, the potential reaches far 
beyond the relationship between private parties and public authorities. Provided 
private parties are to be regarded as direct addressees of fundamental and social 
rights, individual claimants might be entitled to claim an action plan from a 
 138  See  F. Della Negra ,  ‘ Th e Eff ects of the ESMA ’ s Powers on Domestic Contract Law ’ , on fi le 
with author, forthcoming. 
 139  In that sense, see  S.  Grundmann ,  ‘ Th e Bankinter Case on MIFID Regulation and Contract 
Law ’ ( 2013 )  9 ( 3 )  ERCL  267 – 280 . 
 140  J.  Saurer and  K.  Purnhagen ,  ‘ Klimawandel vor Gericht  – Der Rechtsstreit der 
Nichtregierungsorganisation  “ Urgenda ” gegen die Niederlande und seine Bedeutung f ü r 
Deutschland ’ ( 2016 )  14  ZUR (Zeitschrift  f ü r Umweltrecht)  16 ; with regard to the link to 
 Janecek , see  K.  Purnhagen ,  ‘ Towards a Regime of Emission Litigation based on Science ’ 
( 2015 )  6  European Journal of Risk Regulation  443 . 
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multi-national company. Th at is why it becomes imaginable that car owners 
might sue Volkswagen in order to obtain from the company a monitoring plan 
that enables the car owners to understand what the company will do to remedy 
its environmentally defective soft ware. 141 
 Th e connection between substance and procedure is a general characteristic 
of CJEU judgments in private law, most obviously in decisions on jurisdiction 
under the Brussels Convention and the Brussels Regulation. 142 Whilst the 
decision on the competent court is in theory disconnected from the decision 
on the applicable law, there is ample evidence that the CJEU enshrines in the 
procedural test considerations of substantive law. Th e connection is inbuilt 
structurally into Directive 2009/22 on injunctions 143 (as recognised in  Invitel ) 144 
and it is most obvious in the recent developments of the case law in the Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive  – not only  Aziz but also in the  ex offi  cio doctrine.  Aziz 
links declaratory and enforcement proceedings together. Th e party to a contract 
must have the right and the opportunity to be heard as to the substance of the 
matter before a national court, before the other party is allowed to register a 
self-created contractual title. 145 Can this statement be generalised even beyond 
the interplay of declaratory and enforcement proceedings ? It seems reasonable 
to argue that prescription rules may have a similar aff ect as enforcement 
proceedings as the EU right to restitution is restricted. 146 Combined with the  ex 
offi  cio doctrine, the interconnection becomes even closer. National courts have 
to survey and monitor the interplay between substance and procedure in order 
to ensure that it is respected. 
 At fi rst sight, it looks as if secondary community legislation adheres to 
privity of contracts. Th e only exception seems to be the provision of the Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive that permits a linking of the eff ects of an action 
for injunction to the validity of contract terms in individual contracts.  Invitel 
provided the fi rst occasion of the CJEU to discuss the  erga omnes eff ect of the 
action for injunction. Advocate General Trstenjak held the right to be heard was 
infringed; however, the Court did not take up the issue in its fi nal judgment. 
A reference of a Polish court is pending before the CJEU, which is meant to seek 
 141  See  A.  Beckers ,  ‘ Was Versprechen wert sind, Der VW-Skandal zeigt: Freiwillige 
Verhaltensregeln von Unternehmen sollten rechtlich verbindlich werden ’  S ü ddeutsche 
Zeitung ( 21.12.2015 ) pointing to the potential legal implications resulting from the Code of 
Conduct that VW has signed. 
 142  Jä ä skinen and  Ward , n. 36 above. 
 143  See  M.  Ogorzalek ,  Th e Action for Injunction in EU Consumer Law ,  EUI PhD  2014 . 
 144  Invitel, n. 102 above. 
 145  Aziz , n. 74 above, para. 59; under reference to the ECJ,  Case C-432/05,  Unibet [ 2007 ]  ECR 
I-2271 , para. 77. 
 146  H.-W.  Micklitz and  N.  Reich ,  ‘ Th e Court and the Sleeping Beauty, Th e Revival of the Unfair 




 147  Poland belongs to the few countries where an  erga omnes eff ect is part of the legal system, 
although the eff ects are not clear. Th is might be the reason for the reference. 
 148  C. Godt ,  ‘ Intellectual Property and European Fundamental Rights ’ in  Micklitz , n. 4 above, 
pp. 210 – 235. 
 149  See esp.  B.  Van Leeuwen ,  ‘ Th e Impact of Primary EU Law on Private Law: Intellectual 
Property Law ’ in  H.-W.  Micklitz and  C.  Sieburgh (eds.),  Primary EU Law and Private Law 
Concepts ,  Intersentia , Antwerp,  forthcoming  2017 ; also  M.  Leistner ,  ‘ Europe ’ s Copyright 
Law Decade: Recent Case Law of the European Court of Justice and Policy Perspectives ’ ( 2014 ) 
 51  CMLR  559 . 
 150  M.  Kumm ,  ‘ Who Is Afraid of the Total Constitution? Constitutional Rights as Principles and 
the Constitutionalization of Private Law ’ ( 2006 )  7  German LJ  341 . 
clarifi cation. 147 More closely linked to privity of contract are  Putz/Weber and 
 Scarlet . In  Putz/Weber , the CJEU introduced economic reasoning into the right 
of the consumer to claim compensation for the costs that the repair of defective 
tiles in his kitchen produced. Th ereby, the CJEU stretches the boundaries of the 
bilateral contract and integrates the perspective of those potential addressees 
who remain outside the contract.  Putz / Weber takes  ‘ Th e Social ’ type reasoning 
and then balances this against the liberal national law and does so by means 
of an identity-centred approach, i.e. consumer. Th is is a multi-level dimension, 
experimentation or laboratory idea. 
 In  Scarlet an even more far-reaching broadening can be observed, though in 
a much more outspoken way and directly related to Articles 8, 11, 16 and 17 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 148 Th e scope of the assessment of whether 
or not to grant an injunction to the copyright holder (SABAM  – a Belgian 
association representing authors, composers and artists) against the internet 
service provider (Scarlet) to put an end to potential infringements committed by 
Scarlet ’ s customers is extended to three parties, each of them referring to its own 
fundamental right: SABAM to Article 17, Scarlet to Article 16 and the customers 
to Articles 8 and 11. 149 Via the constitutionalisation of private rights, the CJEU 
breaks down privity and balances out the diff erent rights and obligations against 
each other. Th e CJEU has gone as far as obliging Scarlet and its customers to 
take the interests of SABAM into account when negotiating a contract. Th e 
Court then reserves its right to conduct a judicial review of the outcome of the 
negotiation. 
 7. A CLARIFICATION 
 Th e ever stronger impact of constitutionalisation might yield the impression 
that constitutional law and constitutional principles are omnipresent and that 
we are not far away from a  ‘ total constitution ’. 150 A clarifi cation is needed. 
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Th e EU and the European laboratory should not be equated with a federal state. 
Th e CJEU creates  ‘ space ’ 151 for private actors through opening the notion of a 
person, through breaking boxes between contract and commercial practices, 
through introducing a political dimension into property rights, through 
developing new remedies in a multi-level governance structure. It is the interplay 
between private regulation and constitutional transformation beyond the nation 
state that makes EU law and European private law such a fascinating topic for 
research. 
What needs to be done is to contrast the European constitutionalisation of 
European regulatory private law with the constitutionalisation of (traditional) 
private law in the Member States. More needs to be done.
 
 151  S.  Sassen ,  Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages ,  Princeton 
University Press ,  New Jersey  2008 . 
